Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.¹

The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instrumental in aerial reconnaissance efforts, especially with the U-2 spy plane, to monitor Soviet nuclear programs and later, the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona.²

Early Involvement in Psi Research

The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).¹

In 1972, the CIA, through officials like Ken Kress from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for Hal Puthoff's psi research program at Stanford Research Institute (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.¹ In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the Stargate Project, a program that trained individuals in Remote Viewing to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the White House.³

The Search for Behavioral Control

Since World War II the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime OSS quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at Dachau and Albert Hofmann's discovery of LSD. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of Josef Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary, whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through Project BLUEBIRD (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally MKULTRA under the Technical Services Staff, with Richard Helms its most important sponsor and his protégé Sidney Gottlieb running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.⁴

Notable Operations and Impact

• Semipalatinsk: CIA officials tasked Pat Price with remote viewing a mysterious Soviet military research facility at Semipalatinsk. Price's detailed descriptions of a gantry crane and large metal spheres were later confirmed by satellite photography, significantly impressing the Agency and securing further funding for SRI's psi research.¹
• Soviet Diplomat and Fishing Pole: Norm Everheart utilized remote viewers to investigate a Soviet diplomat suspected of using a fishing pole for dead-drop operations, leading to the successful identification of a dead-drop site.¹
• KGB Agent Interrogation: Remote viewers, particularly Ken Bell, were used by the CIA to telepathically interrogate a captured KGB agent in South Africa, extracting information about a hidden pocket calculator used for coding messages. This operation, facilitated by Norm Everheart and Jim Morris, was considered a success despite its unconventional nature.¹
• Tehran Hostage Crisis: During the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979-1980, the CIA and Pentagon tasked remote viewers hundreds of times to gather information on the hostages' whereabouts and conditions. While the remote viewers experienced burnout due to the relentless tasking, the data was considered "no worse" than that collected by more conventional methods.¹
• Moscow Embassy: The CIA tasked remote viewers to assess the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow for Soviet bugs, even before its construction was complete. Remote viewers like Joe McMoneagle accurately described the building being riddled with thousands of bugs and metallic decoys, including girders welded into antennas, which was later confirmed by a CIA/NSA investigation. This prescient remote viewing highlighted a major security fiasco for the U.S. diplomatic efforts.¹

Intelligence Liaison with Israel

The CIA's relationship with Israeli intelligence, particularly Mossad, was extensive, involving 28 formal cooperative ventures in strategic intelligence since the 1950s. These arrangements were often financed off-the-books through a special contingency fund maintained by the Director of Central Intelligence. One such operation, code-named KK MOUNTAIN, involved millions in annual cash payments to Mossad in exchange for their agents acting as American surrogates in North Africa and other regions. Other agreements financed Israeli operations in Syria and the Soviet Union, where the CIA found it difficult to operate.²

In 1977, Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with Israel as part of a CIA restructuring. This led to a sharp reduction in the flow of intelligence from Israel to Washington, D.C.. However, the CIA's "embarrassingly inept reporting on Iran", particularly their failure to anticipate the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, forced the American leadership to turn back to Israeli help in anticipating world events. This contributed to the March 1979 KH-11 agreement, which granted Israel access to high-tech satellite imagery.²

Initially, the KH-11 satellite's images were tightly restricted, even to close allies like Great Britain. However, Jimmy Carter's decision to provide Israel with direct access to the KH-11 in March 1979 disrupted the satellite's careful scheduling and meant less access for some American intelligence agencies. This decision was suspected by some American intelligence officials as a reward for the Camp David summit.²

Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak bombing in June 1981, William J. Casey, Ronald Reagan's Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a review of Israel's use of the KH-11 intelligence-sharing agreement. The review found that Israel had expanded the agreement to extract virtually any photograph desired, including extensive coverage of western Russia and Moscow. This led to anger within the CIA and DIA over the "very lax" management of the liaison agreement. Despite this, it was agreed that photographs would continue to flow to Israel, but with the initial 1979 restrictions re-enforced.²

Involvement with BCCI

The CIA used the BCCI extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in Central America.⁵ Even before Oliver North established his network for illegal payments to the Contras, the National Security Council used BCCI to channel money to them through Saudi Arabia.⁵ The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.⁶

In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned First American Bank since 1982.⁷ In 1991, Acting CIA Director Richard J. Kerr confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.⁸ The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.⁹

William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with Agha Hasan Abedi over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.¹⁰ The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.¹⁰

The Kerry-Brown Senate Report recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, Douglas Mulholland, who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the Madison Hotel in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.¹¹

Operations and Activities

The CIA sent the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War.¹² The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the Mujahideen, but once delivered to Karachi, the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.¹²

In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.¹³ This became the largest covert-action program since World War Two.¹³

UAP Research and Secrecy

The CIA has a long and complex history with the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.³

The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. Dr. William Livingston, who served as a medical advisor to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.³

In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the UAP Task Force and is a member of the current All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.³

Dark Alliance Investigation

The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by Dewey Clarridge from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including Enrique Bermúdez in 1980 and Eden Pastora in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in Costa Rica, notably Joseph Fernández from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.¹⁴

Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case

Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of Cocaine being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including Ilopango Airbase in El Salvador. When defense attorneys in the Frogman Case obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to San Francisco and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."¹⁵

The pseudonymous agent Iván Gómez, assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.¹⁵

The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department

In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General William French Smith signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.¹⁶

Ilopango Obstruction

When DEA agent Celerino Castillo began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."¹⁷

Inspector General Investigation

CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz testified before the House Intelligence Committee in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.¹⁶

Iran-Contra Indictments

Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. Alan Fiers pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director George H.W. Bush.¹⁴