Jonathan Pollard

Jonathan Pollard was a junior civilian analyst with the U.S. Navy who became a paid spy for Israel. He began working in 1979 as a civilian employee of U.S. Navy intelligence and was recruited as an operative in the fall of 1981, three years earlier than he and the Israeli government have admitted. He was then working as an intelligence specialist with the Navy's Field Operations Intelligence Office.²

Early Life and Motivation

Pollard was an unhappy child in South Bend, Indiana, tormented and beaten in grade school for being Jewish. He told an interviewer that the "turning point" of his life came as a result of the Six-Day War, when he was thirteen. Israel's victory was "emotionally intoxicating" and triggered his lifelong obsession with Israeli security, and his fantasies of being part of it. He told fellow undergraduates at Stanford University that he had dual citizenship and was a colonel in the Israeli Army. Bragging and fanciful claims marked his years at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston, where he enrolled in 1977. He failed to earn his degree, and also failed in an attempt to join the CIA. In early 1981, Pollard sought a job as a defense analyst with the AIPAC, but AIPAC officials found his bragging about access to top-secret information inappropriate and "weird," and "got rid of him." There was a feeling that Pollard was part of a "sting" operation attempting to set up AIPAC, and he was clearly seen as trouble.²

Recruitment and Scope of Espionage

Pollard offered his services to Israel in 1980 and 1981, but no serious Israeli intelligence official would consider recruiting an openly pro-Israel American Jew who worked for the American intelligence community, due to an unwritten law prohibiting the recruitment of any American Jew. However, Rafael Eitan, the aggressive new director of LAKAM, decided to change the rules after unproductive meetings with U.S. officials. He agreed with Ariel Sharon that the United States was holding back on intelligence essential to Israeli security, such as KH-11 photography, and recruited Pollard in October 1981. Pollard's recruitment was viewed by military intelligence as "the worst fucking thing Rafi could have done."²

At the height of his activity, in 1984 and 1985, one of his main assignments was the gathering of American intelligence relevant to Israel's nuclear targeting of the oil fields and Soviet military installations in southern Russia. This fact was hidden from Department of Justice investigators and prosecutors by Israeli officials. Pollard insisted in all of his Justice Department interrogations that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Israeli Air Force Colonel Aviem Sella, who was one of his handlers.²

Pollard also gave the Israelis American intelligence on Soviet air defenses, especially the feared SA-5 surface-to-air missile system. He eventually turned over a copy of the U.S. intelligence community's annual review of the Soviet strategic arms system, known as the 11–38, which is considered one of the most sensitive documents in the U.S. government. Pollard also provided Israel with the codes for American diplomatic communications, enabling Israel's signals intelligence agency to intercept cables and backchannel messages. In all, according to federal prosecutors, Pollard provided Israel with eighteen hundred documents—an estimated 500,000 pages—before his arrest.²

Operational Methods and Wife's Involvement

Pollard's wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, was also working with him. Pollard received computer access codes of intelligence reports from Robert McFarlane (referred to as "Mr. X") through Iris, a LAKAM representative in Washington, D.C.. He would print the information, photocopy it, and give the copies to Iris, who would then return the originals to the office. This allowed Israel to receive over a million pieces of paper, including reconnaissance satellite data, U.S. and Soviet aircraft information, and spare parts listed in secret catalogs.¹

To facilitate the transfer of documents, Pollard's handlers in the United States, who included Aviem Sella by mid-1984, even arranged for the Israeli government to provide, via its embassy in Washington, D.C., the most sophisticated photocopying machines for the reproduction of top-secret documents, including KH-11 satellite photographs. These machines arrived with special metal shielding to prevent the interception of electronic emanations.²

KGB Connection and Arrest

Some of the intelligence gathered by Pollard was passed to the KGB by Israel, with the authorization of Yitzhak Shamir. The exposure of Pollard led to his arrest and conviction for espionage. He was later identified as the spy with the arrest of Shabtai Kalmanowitch in late 1987.¹

Israeli Government Response and Cover-up

After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities, and two internal commissions cleared them of direct knowledge. However, Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "Israel's dependence upon a ‘special source’" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.²

The Israeli officials most tarnished by the scandal were Rafael Eitan and Aviem Sella. However, Eitan did not suffer financially and was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, authorized by Ariel Sharon. Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the United States and assigned as commander of Tel Nof, the site of Israel's nuclear-ready air force squadron. After American protests, Sella was instead named head of the Israeli Defense Force staff college, and later retired from the air force in disillusionment.²

Aftermath and Sella's Account

Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C. for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. The Israeli government refused U.S. demands for Sella's extradition, and he was indicted in absentia in March 1987, and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990.²

Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at New York University, believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General Amos Lapidot, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from Yitzhak Rabin, the minister of defense. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."²

Leonard Garment, hired by Israel to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including Chaim Joseph Zadok, Meir Rosenne, Elyakim Rubinstein, Ram Caspi, Avraham Shalom, and Hanan Bar-on, to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.²