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Rafael Eitan

Rafael Eitan, also known as 'Rafi the stinker,' was an ambitious Israeli clandestine operative and a crony of Ariel Sharon.

Rafael Eitan, also known as "Rafi the stinker," was an ambitious Israeli clandestine operative and a crony of Ariel Sharon. He was appointed the new head of LAKAM (Science Liaison Bureau) and also served as Menachem Begin's special assistant for counterterrorism. Eitan had participated in the 1960 kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires and was a veteran of many operations inside the Arab world. He had been forced to resign from Mossad years earlier and was bitter about his stunted career and the failure of Mossad and Israel's other intelligence agencies to cooperate with his counterterrorism office.1

Eitan decided to change the rules after unproductive meetings with U.S. officials, agreeing with Ariel Sharon that the United States was holding back on intelligence essential to Israeli security, such as KH-11 photography. He recruited Jonathan Pollard in October 1981, a move viewed by military intelligence as "the worst fucking thing Rafi could have done."1

Eitan's LAKAM operations in the United States produced a steady stream of routinely transferred scientific and technical documents. Illicitly obtained intelligence flew so voluminously from LAKAM into Israeli intelligence that a special code name, JUMBO, was added to the security markings on the documents. There were strict orders that anything marked JUMBO was not supposed to be discussed with American counterparts.1

Reuven Yerdor, then in charge of Unit 8200, had little respect for Eitan and worried about the long-range implications of Israeli intelligence activities in the United States. Yerdor was convinced Eitan was driven by personal ambition and a need to settle old scores with Yitzhak Hofi, the head of Mossad, and Avraham Shalom, Shin Beth's director. Yerdor also believed that Eitan had recruited two or more Americans, and was dismayed by the fact that Jonathan Pollard's material, marked JUMBO, was not supposed to be discussed with American counterparts.1

After the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Eitan remained in Menachem Begin's cabinet as a minister without portfolio. The Israeli officials most tarnished by the Pollard scandal were Eitan and Aviem Sella. However, Eitan did not suffer financially and was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, authorized by Ariel Sharon.1

PROMIS and LAKAM Intelligence Operations

Eitan is alleged to have played a central role in the Israeli acquisition and international distribution of the PROMIS software. According to Gordon Thomas's account in Gideon's Spies, Eitan traveled to the United States posing as an Israeli Ministry of Justice assistant prosecutor and met with INSLAW founder Bill Hamilton, acquiring a copy of PROMIS through back-channel contacts with the Department of Justice.2 Eitan then assembled a team of former LAKAM programmers who deconstructed the software, rearranged its components, and embedded a "trapdoor" — a built-in chip enabling covert remote monitoring of any database queried by a user of the modified program.2

Eitan stated regarding PROMIS: "We can use that program to stamp out terrorism by keeping track of everyone. But not only that, we can find out what our enemies know too."3 He reportedly admitted collaborating with CIA officials in selling "more than half a billion dollars worth of INSLAW's PROMIS to foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies" as part of joint covert operations to steal intelligence from foreign governments.3

Distribution of the backdoored software was handled in part through British media mogul Robert Maxwell, who used his Israeli computer company Degem and a network of international holdings as vehicles for sales to intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide.2 Eitan's involvement in what became known as the PROMIS Software Scandal was never formally adjudicated; U.S. government investigations, including the Bua Report (1993), found no credible evidence that enhanced PROMIS was distributed internationally.4

  1. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.
  2. Thomas, Gordon. Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. St. Martin's Press, 1999.
  3. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report. House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
  4. U.S. Department of Justice. Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc. March 1993.

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