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Arthur C. Lundahl

Lundahl played a crucial role in the U-2 Spy Plane program, becoming the American government's most listened-to briefing officer.

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Arthur C. Lundahl was a key figure in U.S. aerial reconnaissance, directing the Photographic Intelligence Division of the CIA. He had analyzed reconnaissance photos for the Navy during World War II and was tasked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to address the lack of aerial intelligence on the Soviet Union.1

Lundahl played a crucial role in the U-2 Spy Plane program, becoming the American government's most listened-to briefing officer. He was responsible for presenting intelligence gathered from U-2 flights, including early signs of what would become the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona.1

In late 1958 or early 1959, Lundahl rushed early raw photographs of the Dimona construction to the White House. Despite the clear evidence of a secret nuclear reactor, President Eisenhower showed no interest in further details or follow-up, a decision that puzzled Lundahl. He also relayed his findings on Dimona to Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a few AEC aides.1

By December 1960, the U-2 program was in disarray following the U-2 Incident where Gary Francis Powers was shot down. Lundahl recalled those months as being "full of finger-pointing and turbulence." By the mid-1960s, Lundahl and Dino A. Brugioni had moved on to new assignments in photo interpretation and were no longer directly involved in Israeli nuclear matters. Much of the primary analysis of nuclear intelligence shifted from the CIA to the design and engineering laboratories for nuclear weapons at Los Alamos and Sandia, and later Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Any interesting intelligence on Israel was then routed through the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, headed by Carl E. Duckett, to which Lundahl's National Photo Interpretation Center was reporting. Lundahl and Brugioni eventually realized that Duckett was no longer sharing all information about the Israeli bomb, marking the end of an era for their direct involvement.2

  1. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
  2. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 5, 11.

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