Golda Meir
In 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Foreign Minister, bringing her distinctive approach to Israel's international relations.
Golda Meir was a prominent Israeli politician who served as Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister, playing crucial roles in Israel's diplomatic relations, nuclear policy decisions, and regional strategic calculations during some of the most critical periods in the nation's history.
Rise to Foreign Minister and Nuclear Policy
In 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Foreign Minister, bringing her distinctive approach to Israel's international relations. She endorsed David Ben-Gurion's argument for preventive war, aligning herself with the more hawkish elements within the government. However, despite her official position as Foreign Minister, her ministry was repeatedly bypassed by Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres, Moshe Dayan, and Ernst David Bergmann as Israel broadened its involvement with France in nuclear matters. This pattern of exclusion from the most sensitive nuclear discussions reflected the tight circle of decision-makers who controlled Israel's most classified programs.2
Diplomatic Initiatives and International Relations
As Foreign Minister, Meir was instrumental in expanding Israel's diplomatic footprint during a crucial period of nation-building. She pushed for the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and Germany in the late 1950s, a politically sensitive initiative given the recent history of the Holocaust. Additionally, she worked to open relations with Paraguay, demonstrating Israel's efforts to build ties beyond its immediate region and traditional allies.1
Jordan Relations and Palestinian Policy
Meir's approach to regional politics was shaped by her personal relationships and strategic calculations. In 1948, she formed a friendship with King Abdullah of Jordan, and both leaders believed the Palestinian problem would eventually resolve itself—a view that would prove overly optimistic in subsequent decades.1
This perspective influenced a critical decision during her later tenure. Her choice to mobilize the IDF against the Syrians in 1970, during a crisis with the PLO in Jordan, had far-reaching consequences. While this action prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan and kept King Hussein in power, it also represented a complex strategic calculation. The intervention pleased the Americans by preventing a threat to Saudi oilfields, but was seen by some as a major setback for Israel's long-term strategic interest in a Palestinian state.1
Prime Ministerial Challenges and Intelligence Vulnerabilities
During her tenure as Prime Minister, Meir faced significant intelligence challenges that would have lasting implications for Israel's security. In 1972, her office was bugged by the Soviets, a serious security breach discovered by Reuben Yirador of Unit 8200. This bugging operation, combined with her meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Finland and her rejection of his peace proposal, provided Anwar Sadat with crucial intelligence about Israel's attitude toward potential negotiations. This intelligence may have contributed to Sadat's decision to launch the 1973 war, as he gained insight into Israel's diplomatic positions and strategic thinking.1
The Yom Kippur War and Nuclear Alert
During the desperate early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, on Monday, October 8, Golda Meir convened her closest aides, the "kitchen cabinet," in her office in Tel Aviv. Faced with the imminent collapse of Israeli forces, the leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the Samson Option; and inform Washington, D.C. of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition. Meir, who chain-smoked and slept very little during the early stages of the war, was reportedly confused and concerned by Moshe Dayan's report of imminent collapse. The decision to arm the weapons of last resort, code-named the "Temple" weapons, was reached easily, though there were more complicated discussions about the number of warheads to arm and their targeting. An Israeli assumption was that the Soviets, who would learn of the nuclear arming, would then be compelled to urge their allies in Egypt and Syria to limit their offensive. This drastic step also aimed to force the United States to begin an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military.3
Political Controversies
Meir's leadership style and decisions also generated internal criticism within Israel's military establishment. She was publicly criticized by Ariel Sharon in a Playboy magazine interview, a breach of military protocol that had serious consequences. This public criticism led to Sharon being thrown out of the military in 1970, demonstrating the strict standards for military discipline and public discourse that Meir enforced during her tenure.1
Sources
- Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. TrineDay, 1992. ↩
- Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3. ↩
- Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17. ↩
Local network
Golda Meir's direct connections. Click any node to navigate, drag to pan, scroll (or pinch) to zoom. + 2‑hop expands the neighborhood one level further.
Mentioned in 20
- PersonAlfredo Stroessner
- PersonAnwar Sadat
- PersonDavid Elazar
- ProgramDimona
- PersonGamal Abdel Nasser
- PersonGolda Meir
- PersonJohn F. Kennedy
- PersonLeonid Brezhnev
- ConceptMachons (Dimona Facilities)
- PersonMoshe Dayan
- PersonReuben Yirador
- PersonRuth Hefer
- PersonShalheveth Freier
- PersonSimcha Dinitz
- ProgramUnit 8200
- PersonUri Geller
- PersonWalworth Barbour
- PersonYigal Allon
- EventYom Kippur War