David Ben-Gurion

David Ben-Gurion, often referred to as the "Old Man," was a central figure in the establishment of Israel and served as its first Prime Minister and Defense Minister from 1948 to 1963, with one brief interlude. He was a strong advocate for Israel's self-defense and self-reliance, driven by a private nightmare of a second Holocaust at the hands of the Arabs. He believed that Israel's security would come through its own capabilities, repeatedly linking the nation's security to its progress in science.¹

Ben-Gurion was a key proponent of Israel developing its own atomic reactor, utilizing indigenous natural uranium and locally manufactured heavy water. He publicly stated that nuclear energy would soon produce electricity and desalinated water to make the Negev desert bloom. However, his primary goal was the development of a nuclear bomb, with the public statements serving as a cover. He oversaw this effort with the aid of his protégé, Shimon Peres, and Ernst David Bergmann, who headed the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission under the direct jurisdiction of the defense ministry.¹

Ben-Gurion, Peres, and Bergmann sought international allies and private financing from wealthy American and European Jews to fund the secret nuclear program, believing any other approach would compromise its secrecy.¹

Despite publicly supporting the American position in the Korean War, Ben-Gurion's attempts to secure a regional security pact or inclusion under the American nuclear umbrella were unsuccessful. He even offered to send Israeli troops to fight alongside United Nations forces in South Korea, an offer declined by President Harry S. Truman due to fears of backing into a security arrangement with Israel. Throughout Eisenhower's presidency, America maintained an embargo on arms sales to Israel, further solidifying Ben-Gurion's conviction that Israel needed an independent nuclear arsenal.¹

Ben-Gurion's vision for Israel's nuclear program was not without internal opposition. Many senior members of the ruling Mapai Party viewed an Israeli bomb as suicidal, too expensive, and too reminiscent of the horrors of the Holocaust. However, Ben-Gurion held firm, especially regarding the French-Israeli nuclear cooperation. He believed that Israel's needs coincided perfectly with France's, particularly in the early 1950s when both nations lacked the technical capacity to build a bomb independently.¹

In late 1953, a disillusioned Ben-Gurion retired to his desert kibbutz at Sdeh Boker, near the future site of Dimona. He believed he could revive the pioneering spirit of Israeli society by resettling in the desert. His political control over the Mapai Party remained absolute, and he decreed that his jointly held positions of prime minister and defense minister be separated and filled by his chosen successors, Moshe Sharett as the new prime minister and Pinhas Lavon as defense minister. Ben-Gurion also arranged for Moshe Dayan to become the new army chief of staff, ensuring that Sharett's dovish policies would not go unchallenged.²

Ben-Gurion's immediate public mission after returning to office in 1955 was to restore the army's morale and public confidence. He was more convinced than ever that a policy of military reprisal was essential. Six days after taking office, on February 28, 1955, he authorized a large-scale retaliation against an Egyptian military camp at Gaza, led by Ariel Sharon, in response to a cross-border attack by Palestinian guerrillas. This raid escalated tensions and ended secret contacts between Sharett and Nasser.²

In late 1955, Ben-Gurion once again served as both defense minister and prime minister. With no international protest over the Canadian reactor sale, he decided in mid-September to formally seek French help for the Israeli bomb. He had already picked a location for the Israeli reactor in the basement of an old deserted winery at Rishon LeZion. He sent Shimon Peres with Ernst David Bergmann to Paris to negotiate for a reactor.²

Ben-Gurion was pleased with Charles de Gaulle's promises of continued military aid, but he was not willing to trade an Israeli bomb for French warplanes. He did nothing to change the status quo at Dimona after his meeting with de Gaulle, and privately owned French construction firms continued their vigorous presence at Dimona until 1966.²