Samson Option

The Samson Option is a concept deeply ingrained in Israel's national security doctrine, referring to the idea that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal that it would use as a last resort to prevent its destruction, even if it means causing massive destruction to its enemies. The name derives from the biblical figure Samson, who, captured by the Philistines, pulled down the pillars of Dagon's Temple, killing himself and his enemies. For Israel's nuclear advocates, the Samson Option became another way of saying "Never again," echoing the sentiment of survivors of the Holocaust.¹

Seymour Hersh's book, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, published in 1991, details how Israel secretly became a nuclear power and how this secret was largely ignored or sanctioned by top political and military officials of the United States since the Eisenhower years. The book also explores the origins and implications of this doctrine.²

Origins and Development

The concept of the Samson Option was a central argument for Israel's nuclear advocates, who believed that only nuclear weapons could provide the absolute and final deterrent to the Arab threat. They argued that a nuclear arsenal would convince Arab nations, bolstered by rapidly growing Soviet economic and military aid, that they must renounce all plans for military conquest of Israel and agree to a peace settlement. This was seen as a way to ensure that there would be "no more Masadas" in Israel's history, referencing the ancient Jewish stronghold where defenders chose mass suicide over defeat.¹

Key figures like Ernst David Bergmann, David Ben-Gurion, and Shimon Peres were early proponents of developing Israel's nuclear capabilities, with the public pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy serving as a cover for their weapons ambitions. They sought private financing from wealthy American and European Jews to maintain the secrecy of the program.³

Political and Military Debates

The pursuit of the Samson Option was not without internal opposition within Israel. Many senior members of the ruling Mapai Party viewed an Israeli bomb as suicidal, too expensive, and too reminiscent of the horrors of World War II. Levi Eshkol, as finance minister and later prime minister, was a perennial critic of the nuclear program, arguing that the immense cost diverted funds from essential conventional military needs and social programs. He questioned the necessity of such an investment when no neighboring Arab nation possessed nuclear weapons.¹

Old-fashioned military men like Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin initially believed that Israel's advantage lay in the quality of its conventional military personnel, viewing nuclear weapons as a great equalizer that would make a nuclear-armed Egypt far more dangerous. However, Moshe Dayan became a strong proponent of the bomb, convinced that Israel could not depend on America to deter a Soviet attack and that a credible Israeli nuclear threat was necessary to influence superpower actions in the Middle East.¹

Implementation and Implications

By early 1968, Moshe Dayan unilaterally pushed Dimona into full-scale production, leading to the manufacture of four or five warheads a year. This decision was made without a formal cabinet resolution, but was widely applauded by the top layer of national security officials. The first assembly line bomb was reportedly welded with the phrase: "NEVER AGAIN."¹

The Samson Option implies a strategy of deliberate ambiguity regarding Israel's nuclear capabilities. This "bomb in the basement" approach aimed to deter potential adversaries without explicitly confirming possession, thereby avoiding international condemnation and a regional nuclear arms race. However, this ambiguity also led to constant international pressure and scrutiny, particularly from the United States, which sought to prevent nuclear proliferation.¹

During the desperate early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, faced with the imminent collapse of Israeli forces, the leadership resolved to arm and target its nuclear arsenal as a last resort, implementing the Samson Option. This drastic step was also intended to force the United States to begin an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military. The initial target list included Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters. While no weapons were targeted on the Soviet Union, it was understood that the Soviets would quickly learn of the nuclear arming.⁴