Moshe Dayan

Moshe Dayan (1915–1981) was a highly prominent Israeli military leader and politician, famous for his signature black eye-patch and his pivotal role in shaping Israel's military doctrine and nuclear policy. Throughout his career, he served in various high-level positions including army chief of staff, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister, while also developing an unusual passion for archaeological treasure hunting.¹²³

Early Military Leadership

Dayan's rise to prominence began when David Ben-Gurion appointed him as the new army chief of staff in late 1953, with the strategic aim of ensuring that Moshe Sharett's dovish views on the Arab question would not go unchallenged. In this role, Dayan maintained almost constant contact with Ben-Gurion at his kibbutz and actively sought to stifle Sharett's policies and his secret talks with the Egyptians.³

Major Military Campaigns and Nuclear Policy

As Defense Minister, Dayan emerged as a hero of the 1956 Suez Crisis campaign, establishing his reputation as a formidable military strategist. His influence continued to grow, and in 1967, he became Defense Minister as part of the reconstituted coalition government under Levi Eshkol. In this capacity, he oversaw the capture of East Jerusalem during the 1967 Six-Day War, cementing his status as one of Israel's most celebrated military leaders.²

Dayan's involvement in Israel's nuclear program was extensive and controversial. He was Defense Minister when Israel agreed to show the Dimona to American inspectors, and when Israel refused to sign a United Nations agreement not to test nuclear weapons. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Syrian forces penetrated the Golan Heights, Dayan made the dramatic decision to order the arming of all 13 Israeli nuclear bombs and put 24 B-52 bombers on standby, bringing the region perilously close to nuclear conflict.²

His tenure as Defense Minister also included oversight of controversial military actions, including when Israel bombed the USS Liberty in 1967. Additionally, he managed Israel's efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities with new international partners, particularly South Africa, after France severed relations following the 1967 war.²

Dayan's drive for the bomb was heightened by his conviction that Israel could not depend on America to deter a Soviet attack. He believed that Moscow would be willing to come to the aid of the Arabs to protect its prestige and international interests, and that unless Israel armed itself fully, the superpowers would dictate events in the Middle East. In Dayan's view, Israel's survival was dependent on its ability to mass-produce nuclear weapons and target them at the Soviet Union, mirroring France's force de frappe.⁴

Dayan's mission in late 1967 and early 1968 was to convince his fellow cabinet members that a credible Israeli nuclear threat would deter the Soviets from supporting an all-out Arab attack on Israel or supplying an Arab nation with nuclear weapons. He envisioned a scenario where Israeli intelligence agents would secretly inform their Soviet counterparts once Dimona's assembly line went into full production, and when Israel developed its first bomb in a suitcase. For the rest of the world, including the United States, there would still be studied ambiguity on the question of whether Israel had the bomb, thus giving birth to the argument for an Israeli "bomb in the basement."⁴

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Dayan's panic on Monday, October 8, was widely known among Israelis. He assessed the situation as desperate, stating, "Everything is lost. We must withdraw." This led to a dramatic meeting in Golda Meir's office, where the Israeli leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the Samson Option; and inform Washington, D.C. of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition.⁵

Dayan's standing among his peers in the military and the upper echelons of the Israeli government declined due to his incessant womanizing, financial dealings, and propensity to talk. He was considered a "loose cannon" at a time when Israel was in a precarious situation. While he lost no authority, it was eventually made clear to him that he was no longer welcome at Dimona, as he no longer had a military need to know anything about the Israeli nuclear program, which was being managed out of the prime minister's office.⁵

His perspective on the Palestinian problem remained notably limited. Along with Golda Meir, he believed the Palestinian issue would eventually resolve itself, a view that reflected the thinking of many Israeli leaders of his generation but would prove overly optimistic in the decades that followed.²

Archaeological Pursuits and Psychic Collaborations

Beyond his official duties, Dayan developed an illicit pastime of digging up archaeological treasures across Israel and the Sinai without a license or scientific oversight. His unconventional method for finding ancient sites often involved "visions" he experienced early in the morning. He would then drive to these sites, comb through the earth, and bring home relics for display in his home. The dangers of this unauthorized archaeological work became evident in 1968, when he was badly injured by a landslide while looting artifacts from a cave.¹

In the summer of 1970, Dayan began an unusual collaboration with Uri Geller, who was then becoming Israel's most famous psychic. Geller recalls spending hours over maps, using an ancient form of clairvoyance called Dowsing to help Dayan locate ancient artifacts and archaeological finds illegally. Reflecting on this period, Geller later stated, "I was young and naïve at the time. Here I was, talking to the Moshe Dayan."¹

This controversial partnership came to an end in 1971 after a group of twenty Israeli archaeologists signed a petition urging Dayan to give up his "legally questionable hobby." While Dayan discussed his illegally acquired collection in his 1978 memoir, Living with the Bible, he notably did not mention using Geller as a map dowser, perhaps seeking to distance himself from the more eccentric aspects of his archaeological pursuits.¹

Diplomatic Career and Political Philosophy

In his later political career, Dayan transitioned to diplomatic roles, serving as Foreign Minister and becoming a key figure who urged Menachem Begin to sign the Camp David Accords. Begin reluctantly agreed to the accords under significant pressure from Carter, with Dayan's advocacy playing a crucial role in this historic peace agreement.²

Despite his military prowess and diplomatic involvement, Dayan's perspective on the Palestinian problem remained notably limited. Along with Golda Meir, he believed the Palestinian issue would eventually resolve itself, a view that reflected the thinking of many Israeli leaders of his generatzion but would prove overly optimistic in the decades that followed.²

Publications

• Living with the Bible (1978)