William Broe

William V. Broe was chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA in 1970. With the deputy director for plans, Thomas Karamessines, he supervised the task force formed that September to keep Salvador Allende from the presidency of Chile, whose military unit was headed by David Atlee Phillips. The operation was Project FUBELT.¹

The Program

On September 9, six days before President Richard Nixon's order, Broe cabled the Santiago station chief, Henry Hecksher: "The only prospect with any chance of success whatsoever is a military golpe either before or immediately after Allende's assumption of power." On September 28 he and Phillips told the station: "We conclude that it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that will force the military and the president to take some action in the desired direction." The program had three parts, economic, political, and psychological warfare, and was meant to "(a) force Frei to act or go; (b) create an atmosphere in which he or others can act successfully; (c) assist in creating the flashpoint for action." On October 7 they directed the station to "begin at once a rumor campaign, based whenever possible on tangible peg, which will help create this climate."¹

On September 29 Broe met Edward Gerrity, senior vice president of ITT, to "explore the feasibility of possible actions to apply some economic pressure on Chile." Gerrity reported to Harold Geneen that the CIA man had presented a plan "aimed at inducing economic collapse."¹

Testimony

Under oath before Senator Frank Church in 1973, Broe said he had called on Gerrity on the instruction of Director Richard Helms and "in full knowledge" of his superiors. He confirmed each measure discussed: banks "not renewing credits or delaying in doing so," companies "dragging their feet in spending money and making deliveries and in shipping spare parts," "creating pressure on savings and loan institutions in Chile so that they would have to shut their doors," and "withdrawing all technical help." He gave Gerrity a list of companies that could "participate." Asked whether the object was unrest that would lead the military to stop Allende, he answered: "No." The purpose, he said, was the Christian Democratic vote in Congress. "There was a thesis that additional deterioration in the economic situation could influence a number of Christian Democratic Congressmen who were planning to vote for Allende." He had not told Gerrity of "other steps the Agency might be taking."

The subcommittee summarized his evidence in four points. On July 16, 1970, at the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel, Geneen "offered to assemble a substantial election fund" for Jorge Alessandri, "controlled and channeled through the C.I.A.," which Broe refused. The contacts "derived from an initiative taken by Mr. McCone with Mr. Helms." Broe proposed to Gerrity "a plan of action designed to create or accelerate economic instability in Chile." And throughout he "was acting with the knowledge and in accordance with instructions given him by his superiors at the C.I.A., specifically including Mr. Helms." John McCone, a director of ITT and still a consultant to the agency, testified that such ideas were "never approved by Mr. Helms" and that Broe "was exploring."²

Schneider

Broe and Phillips asked Hecksher whether there was "anything we or Station can do to effect the removal of Schneider," the army commander, and on October 18 approved the station's request for three submachine guns. They ordered Hecksher "not, repeat not," to tell Ambassador Edward Korry of the "impending coup" and, "should it occur," to "appear surprised and stonewall any and all queries." General René Schneider was shot on October 22. After briefing Director Richard Helms they cabled: "The Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a military solution is at least an option for them." If any "points of compromise" reached the press, "absolute denial will be the order of the day even with Ambassador and other embassy colleagues," and the agency's "position will be stonewall all the way." On November 5 Broe cabled his concern that the American "hardware could ultimately be discovered."¹

On November 19, 1970, he presented the agency's new covert program against Allende's government to the 40 Committee. Before testifying to the Senate's multinationals subcommittee in 1973 on his dealings with ITT, he met Senator Frank Church and the staff on March 15 to settle the scope of his testimony.¹³