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Rene Schneider

Commander of the Chilean army who held that the military must respect the 1970 election and was shot on October 22, 1970, by officers whom the CIA had paid, armed, and encouraged to kidnap him.

General René Schneider was commander in chief of the Chilean army from 1969. In an interview with El Mercurio on May 8, 1970, he stated that the army would respect the constitutional process and the outcome of that year's presidential election, a position that became known as the Schneider Doctrine. He was shot in Santiago on the morning of October 22, 1970, two days before the Chilean Congress was to confirm Salvador Allende, and died on October 25.1

The Obstacle

After Allende's plurality on September 4, Ambassador Edward Korry cabled that Schneider "would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary." On September 15 President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to organize a coup, in the operation later known as Project FUBELT. On October 13 headquarters asked the Santiago station: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" The station answered that the retired General Roberto Viaux meant to kidnap Schneider within 48 hours.1

Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and the deputy director for plans, Thomas Karamessines, met at the White House on October 15. The memorandum of the meeting records the judgment that Viaux "did not have more than one chance in twenty" and a decision to send him a message warning him against acting alone. It refers to "the use of false flag officers." The cable that went to Santiago the next day, released by David Atlee Phillips, stated that "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup," and added: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela, et al, and we wish them optimum good fortune."2

The Guns

On October 18 the station asked headquarters for "three 45 calibre machine guns (grease guns)" with "500 rounds ammo" for the group of General Camilo Valenzuela and raised the concern that the weapons might be "identified by serial numbers." They came by diplomatic pouch. The army attache, Paul Wimert, delivered them at two in the morning on October 22, with authority to pay Valenzuela 50,000 dollars. Valenzuela's group had tried and failed to seize Schneider on October 19 and 20.12

Six hours after the delivery Schneider's car was blocked on his way to work. He drew his pistol and was shot with handguns. A Chilean military court found that two groups of officers, active and retired, had conspired to kidnap him and bring about a coup, and "that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting." Viaux was sentenced to twenty years as "intellectual author" of the attempt. Valenzuela was sentenced to three years in exile. Martial law was declared on the day of the shooting and Valenzuela was given command of Santiago province. The CIA's task force log recorded: "The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan." Director Richard Helms concluded the next day that "a maximum effort has been achieved." The agency later paid 35,000 dollars to members of the group that had attacked Schneider. Wimert retrieved the machine guns and threw them into the Pacific. General Carlos Prats succeeded to the command.13

Schneider v. Kissinger

René and Raúl Schneider and other members of the family sued Kissinger and the United States in the federal court in Washington on November 12, 2002. The complaint alleged that on September 15, 1970, Nixon ordered that the CIA "play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile," said he was "not concerned" about the risks, authorized ten million dollars, and required a plan within 48 hours. The district court dismissed the case in 2004, and the court of appeals affirmed in 2005, holding that the decision to support a coup in a foreign country was a political question that courts could not review.4

  1. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, interim report, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, part III.F.
  2. Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The CIA and Chile: Anatomy of an Assassination," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 728, October 22, 2020, documents 23595 (memorandum of conversation, October 15, 1970), 23596 (cable, October 16, 1970), and 23598 (cable, October 18, 1970). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-10-22/cia-chile-anatomy-assassination
  3. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, staff report, 1975.
  4. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), affirmed, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); complaint, November 12, 2002, National Security Archive document 23606.

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