Henry Hecksher

Henry Hecksher was the chief of the CIA station in Santiago during the agency's attempt in the fall of 1970 to keep Salvador Allende from the presidency of Chile. His cables were signed "Felix."¹

Objection

On September 9, 1970, William Broe, chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, cabled him that "the only prospect with any chance of success whatsoever is a military golpe either before or immediately after Allende's assumption of power." Hecksher answered on September 23: "Forget about black operations and propagandistic conditioning of Armed Forces. They barely read," and warned that the "parameter of action is exceedingly narrow." He later testified in secret to the Senate: "I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable." In late September he was recalled to headquarters and told to cease his objections. On October 7 the head of the task force, David Atlee Phillips, instructed him that the station's cables "should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken."¹

The Operation

With the army attaché, Colonel Paul Wimert, and officers sent in under false nationalities, Hecksher made some two dozen approaches to Chilean military and police officers between late September and late October. The message was that the United States would cut off military aid unless they moved. On October 8 he and a senior officer of the Carabineros went over the "available means to remove" the army commander, General René Schneider. "Abduction attempt might lead to bloodshed," they concluded, and "Schneider's accidental death would rally army firmly behind flag of constitutionalism." He told a police official that "the U.S.G. did not really care as long as resulting chaos denied Allende the presidency." Broe and Phillips asked him: "anything we or Station can do to effect the removal of Schneider? We know this [is a] rhetorical question but want to inspire thought on both ends on this matter."¹

Ambassador Edward Korry, who had not been told of the operation, learned of coup plotting from his own sources and ordered Hecksher and Wimert to keep away from the Chilean military. "I am appalled to discover that there is liaison for coup plotting," he cabled Henry Kissinger. When Hecksher proposed using Korry to carry a message to President Frei, headquarters replied that this "would be tantamount to having Korry act as unwitting agent in implementing Track II of which he is not aware and is not to be made aware." Broe and Phillips ordered him "not, repeat not," to tell Wimert or Korry of the "impending coup," and "should it occur, COS Hecksher should appear surprised and stonewall any and all queries."¹

Schneider was shot on October 22. Headquarters cabled: "The Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a military solution is at least an option for them. COS [and others involved] are commended." Korry asked Hecksher directly whether the agency had been "engaged in activities of any kind" that would support charges that Wimert was involved. Hecksher "replied that 'charges could obviously be made. Since Station not involved, COS doubted that charges could be substantiated.'" He and Wimert drove seventy miles to Viña del Mar and threw the submachine guns into the Pacific Ocean. In December 1970 he was recalled to Langley to plan work with elements of the Christian Democratic Party.¹

Wimert recalled that when Augusto Pinochet, then at the military college, wanted a geography of Chile printed, "we went to CIA old Henry Hecksler and he just had 100 copies made."²