Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a son of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab Emirates, was in early 1978 one of four Middle Eastern "investors" in whose names the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) bought close to 20 percent of the voting shares of Financial General Bankshares (FGB), the Washington bank holding company later renamed First American Bankshares. The Kerry-Brown Senate Report called him "the crown prince of the Abu Dhabi royal family," and a chronology entered in the record of the House Banking Committee's hearing of September 11, 1991 called him "the crown prince of Abu Dhabi."¹²

The Sami Memorandum

From December 1977 through February 1978 BCCI, acting through Agha Hasan Abedi, Abdus Sami and other agents, bought almost 20 percent of FGB, stating in filings with American regulators that it had bought the shares for four foreign clients: Kamal Adham of Saudi Arabia; Abdullah Darwaish, for the benefit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, described in the House chronology as "a minor and son of the ruler of Abu Dhabi"; Faisal Saud al-Fulaij of Kuwait; and Sultan bin Zayed.² In a telex to Abedi of January 30, 1978, Sami wrote: "We have already given the names of Sheikh Kamal Adham and Mr. Fulaig [sic]. We want two other names immediately." The same telex, reproduced in the House hearing record, referred to "our desire to keep individual ownership to below 5 percent" and warned that BCCI had "to be careful that our name does not appear as financier" for most of the buyers.³⁴

"Within a matter of days following the writing of the Sami memorandum," the Senate report stated, "BCCI added the crown prince of the Abu Dhabi royal family, Sheik Sultan bin Zayed al Nahyan, and Abdulah Darwaish, financial adviser to the Abu Dhabi royal family, as the two additional shareholders for the purpose of the takeover referred to by Sami."¹ According to Abu Dhabi, Abedi had solicited their participation and they understood it to be a passive investment in a bank with high growth potential. The Senate report observed that "little if any investigation could have been done by the Abu Dhabi investors into the proposed investment between the time of the Sami memorandum and the time of their share purchases."³

Litigation

Financial General's management sued the Arab buyers, BCCI and Abedi in 1978, and the Securities and Exchange Commission opened an inquiry in mid-February of that year. Clark Clifford later told the Senate that his firm had been "retained to represent Bert Lance, Agha Hasan Abedi, BCCI, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zaied al Nahyan, Sheikh Sultan bin Zaied al Nahyan, Faisal al Fulaij, and Abdullah Darwaish."¹

In July and August 1978 BCCI formed Credit and Commerce American Holdings (CCAH) in the Netherlands Antilles and its subsidiary Credit and Commerce American Investment B.V. in Amsterdam as vehicles for acquiring FGB. On October 18, 1978, according to the House chronology, "Sheik Sultan Bin Zaid Al Nahyan sold his shares in FG to Adham." The next day CCAH, CCAI and a new holding company applied to the Federal Reserve to become bank holding companies by acquiring all the voting shares of FGB.²

Nominee Findings

In its report to the Bank of England of June 1991 under section 41 of the Banking Act, Price Waterhouse wrote: "We have . . . seen evidence to suggest . . . that the four investors [Kamal Adham, Faisal al Fulaij, Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed and Abdullah Darweish on behalf of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed] were used to keep individual ownership below 5% and to ensure that BCCI's name did not appear." According to information the Senate subcommittee obtained from "a Pakistani national familiar with the transaction," Sultan bin Zayed's shares and those held by Darwaish for Sheikh Mohammed "were 'allocated' by BCCI for the purpose of avoiding the SEC filing requirement that would have had to have been undertaken if the Abu Dhabi interests were combined together."³

Abu Dhabi "vigorously denied that it was involved in any nominee arrangements with BCCI." The Senate report answered that "given the fact that BCCI had nominee arrangements with the leaders of three other emirates in the United Arab Emirates, as well as with all of the other principal Arab 'investors' involved with BCCI, the lack of involvement of Abu Dhabi in nominee arrangements would have been contrary to BCCI's practice."³

Political Agenda

Bert Lance described to the Senate subcommittee a meeting with Sheikh Zayed and Abedi in Islamabad in late 1977: "Abedi was concerned about the shifting tides towards the Soviets in Afghanistan, Iran, India and the Mideast. Both Abedi and Zayed each expressed their concerns about the Arab worlds lack of ties to the US. They wanted to do something about it." Answering a written question from the subcommittee chairman, John Kerry, Abu Dhabi's representative Ahmed Al Sayegh stated: "The shares that were purchased for Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Mohammed were solely intended as a passive commercial investment, not to acquire influence in the United States."³