Emmett O'Brien

Emmett O'Brien was a colonel in U.S. Army military intelligence who, while a student at the US Army War College in 1971, researched and produced a systematic study of defection as a psychological warfare technique. His paper drew on case material from the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam wars as well as peacetime defections, including Cubans entering the United States and people leaving Russia since the Second World War.¹

The Five-Phase Defection Model

O'Brien's study identified five phases in the defection process: inducement, reception and interrogation, training, resettlement and employment, and follow-up. He argued that the most important single element was communicating to the potential defector, in advance, the specific promise that would induce him to come over. In Vietnam during March 1969, a typical month by his account, psychological warfare personnel dropped 713 million leaflets and distributed three million more by hand, all aimed at inducing defection, plus 156,000 posters supporting defection, more than 2,000 hours of broadcasting, and approximately 12,000 face-to-face interactions.¹

O'Brien's most important practical finding was that the most effective technique for inducing defection was using the voices and stories of insurgents who had already surrendered. Studies indicated that many potential defectors agonized silently for six months or more before acting, and that they should therefore be treated gently after surrender to avoid deterring future defectors who were watching. He recommended that early in the reception process, each defecting insurgent be asked whether he wished to volunteer knowledge about weapons caches or hideout locations, arguing that this established bona fides and psychologically reinforced the defector's commitment to his new side.¹

Observations on Defector Reintegration

O'Brien found that in the Philippines, Malayan, and Vietnam wars, while no single psychological profile of the insurgent could be constructed, many men joined terrorist organizations partly because they lacked the vocational skills needed to earn a living by other means. He recommended that captured fighters be trained in appropriate crafts after defection to prevent their slipping back into prior networks. Such training, he argued, should address political, vocational, and literacy dimensions. He noted that defectors tended to remain socially unpopular for considerable periods, complicating resettlement.¹

F.H. Lakin's Malaya Research

O'Brien's findings are closely paralleled by F.H. Lakin's earlier research on defection in Malaya during 1952 to 1955. Lakin had found that most defectors were politically uncommitted rather than ideologically converted, that leaflets were the most widely seen psychological warfare technique, and that promises of good treatment were the most effective inducement. Together the two studies represented the state of US Army knowledge on defection psychology by the early 1970s.¹