Aman

The Military Intelligence Directorate (Agaf HaModi'in, Aman) of the Israel Defense Forces is, in the IDF's description, "one of the oldest Directorates in the IDF. It was established as soon as the state of Israel was founded." Its stated mission is "to supply the government and IDF with intelligence warnings and alerts daily and during wartime to protect Israel from threats."¹ It works alongside Mossad and Shin Bet among the intelligence services of Israel.

Structure

The directorate is made up of three main units, Unit 8200, Unit 9900 and Unit 504, "the biggest of which is the 8200 Unit, the Military Intelligence Directorate's main information gathering unit." Unit 8200 develops and operates collection tools and analyzes and distributes what it gathers, and in wartime its soldiers join field headquarters. The IDF lists among the directorate's roles listening, which requires "a very high level of Arabic," selective translation of intercepted material, the interpretation of aerial imagery into maps, and the construction of secure computer terminals. The Intelligence Corps also includes the commando unit Sayeret Matkal, which "is not part of any regional command; it only responds to orders from the Chief of General Staff." An IDF page dated December 29, 2021, named Major General Tamir Hayman as head of the directorate.¹

The Agranat Commission

The Agranat Commission inquired into the conduct of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Its first, interim report, published on April 1, 1974, contained "some personal recommendations regarding senior IDF officers and the political echelon's responsibility," and institutional recommendations on "the conduct of the Government and the Intelligence Community"; two further reports followed. In the account of the Israeli Ministry of Defense archive, "most of the blame was cast upon the military." The government of Golda Meir resigned in April 1974 and was succeeded by a government under Yitzhak Rabin, with Shimon Peres as defense minister; the chief of staff, David Elazar, resigned and was replaced by Mordechai Gur, and several other senior IDF officers were dismissed.²

The report runs to seven volumes. In April 1994, after a petition to the High Court of Justice, the government allowed it to be read under conditions that included "non-disclosure of alertness and intelligence issues," and it was made public on January 1, 1995. Under Government Decision 3317 of February 27, 2005, a public commission of Yitzhak Engelard, Moshe Vardi and Benyamin Amidror reviewed the classified parts; the whole final report was disclosed in 2006, save sections whose release might still harm state security or foreign relations, and the Engelard Commission went on to approve the release of fifty testimonies from the Agranat protocols. The reports have been open on the archive's website since February 2012.²

External Relations Department

Ari Ben-Menashe has said that he worked from 1977 to 1987 as a civilian in the directorate's External Relations Department, and has written that the department was created after the Agranat recommendations around an existing unit called Foreign Liaison. The Israeli government said that he had worked for military intelligence as a translator.³⁴

October 7

On April 22, 2024, the IDF announced that Major General Aharon Haliva, "in coordination with the chief of the general staff, has requested to end his position, following his leadership responsibility as the head of the intelligence directorate for the events of October 7." With the approval of the defense minister, Yoav Gallant, it was decided that he "will end his position and retire" from the army "once his successor is appointed in an orderly and professional process." Haliva, who had served 38 years, was the first senior Israeli official to take responsibility for failing to prevent the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, in which more than 1,100 people were killed and about 240 taken captive. His resignation letter stated: "The intelligence directorate under my command did not live up to the task we were entrusted with. I carry that black day with me ever since, day after day, night after night. I will carry the horrible pain of the war with me forever." The analyst Yossi Mekelberg of Chatham House said the pressure on Haliva also stemmed from the failure to anticipate Iran's missile response to Israel's strike on its consular building in Damascus.⁵