---
category: Intelligence & Government
summary: Reuven Yerdor, also known as Rudi, was an accomplished linguist and a senior
  officer in Israel's Detachment 515 (later redesignated Detachment 8200), which is
  in charge of signals intelligence and code-breaking.
tags:
- Person
- CIA
- NSA
- Israel
- Soviet
- Military
---

Reuven Yerdor, also known as Rudi, was an accomplished linguist and a senior officer in [Israel](/places/israel/)'s Detachment 515 (later redesignated Detachment 8200), which is in charge of signals intelligence and code-breaking. He had cracked a Soviet code, for which he later received [Israel](/places/israel/)'s highest defense medal. By early 1982, Yerdor had been promoted to brigadier general and was in charge of [Unit 8200](/organizations/unit-8200/), the Israeli communications intelligence service.[^1]

Yerdor worked closely with his counterparts in the American [NSA](/organizations/nsa/), traveling to [Washington, D.C.](/places/washington-dc/) every three months for liaison meetings. His official title was deputy chief of staff for military intelligence in the [Israel](/places/israel/). Over the 1981–82 New Year's holiday, Yerdor was summoned by [Yehoshua Saguy](/people/yehoshua-saguy/), the head of Aman (military intelligence), and given two packets of documents to evaluate: one with highly technical American intelligence describing a Soviet military system in the hands of the Arabs, and the other with daily and weekly summaries of worldwide [NSA](/organizations/nsa/) intercepts.[^1]

In February 1982, [Israel](/places/israel/) learned that the Soviets had decided to upgrade the Syrian air defense command with SA-5 missiles. Yerdor was told that there was very little intelligence available on the system, but two days later, he received full U.S. intelligence on the SA-5, which made it clear it was not as good as feared. In mid-May 1982, three weeks before the invasion of [Lebanon](/places/lebanon/), Yerdor's office received an astonishing assortment of invaluable American technical data about the air defense systems in [Syria](/places/syria/), including detailed information on side-looking radar, electronic maps, and precise frequency of operations for [Syria](/places/syria/)'s SA-6, SA-8, and advanced SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems.[^1]

Yerdor had little respect for [Rafael Eitan](/people/rafael-eitan/) and worried about the long-range implications of Israeli intelligence activities in the [United States](/places/united-states/), its best ally. He was convinced Eitan was driven by personal ambition and a need to settle old scores with [Yitzhak Hofi](/people/yitzhak-hofi/), the head of [Mossad](/organizations/mossad/), and [Avraham Shalom](/people/avraham-shalom/), Shin Beth's director. He also believed that Eitan had recruited two or more Americans, and was dismayed by the fact that [Jonathan Pollard](/people/jonathan-pollard/)'s material, marked JUMBO, was not supposed to be discussed with American counterparts.[^1]

[Ari Ben-Menashe](/people/ari-ben-menashe/) was aware of Yerdor's distress about the spying, noting that Yerdor was "bitching about the fact that Eitan was compromising [Israel](/places/israel/)'s relations with the [United States](/places/united-states/)."[^1]

[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.