--- alias: - Maxwell Taylor - Maxwell D. Taylor - Maxwell Davenport Taylor - General Maxwell Taylor - General Maxwell D. Taylor - General Taylor born: 1901-08-26 category: Intelligence & Government created: 2026-10-01 died: 1987-04-19 location: Keytesville, Missouri (born); Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington (died) relations: - end: 1959-07 fn: 2 role: chief of staff of the Army start: 1955-06-30 type: head_of with: '[[U.S. Army]]' - end: 1960 fn: 1 role: chairman of the board start: 1959 type: head_of with: '[[Mexican Light and Power Company]]' - fn: 1 role: president type: head_of with: '[[Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts]]' - end: 1961-06-13 fn: 9 role: chairman of the board of inquiry on the Bay of Pigs start: 1961-04-22 type: head_of with: '[[Cuba Study Group]]' - end: 1961-06-13 fn: 9 role: chairman, Cuba Study Group start: 1961-04-22 type: investigated with: '[[Bay of Pigs]]' - fn: 5 role: member named in the White House release of May 4, 1961; listed again in May 1966 start: 1961-05-04 type: member_of with: '[[President''s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]' - fn: 1 reverse: true role: military representative of the President start: 1961-07-01 type: appointed with: '[[John F. Kennedy]]' - fn: 6 role: chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) during Operation Mongoose type: head_of with: '[[NSC Special Group]]' - fn: 6 role: chairman of the overseeing Special Group (Augmented) type: participant_in with: '[[Operation Mongoose]]' - end: 1962-11-07 fn: 18 role: chairman as military representative of the President; NSAM 204 transferred the chair to State start: 1962-01-18 type: head_of with: '[[Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)]]' - end: 1964-07-01 fn: 2 role: chairman start: 1962-10-01 type: head_of with: '[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]' - fn: 3 reverse: true role: ambassador to South Vietnam start: 1964-07-01 type: appointed with: '[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]' - end: 1965-07-30 fn: 3 role: ambassador; credentials presented July 14, 1964 start: 1964-07-01 type: head_of with: '[[United States Embassy in Saigon]]' - end: 1969 fn: 2 role: president start: 1966 type: head_of with: '[[Institute for Defense Analyses]]' summary: Army general who chaired the 1961 Bay of Pigs inquiry and the Special Group (Augmented), sat on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired the Joint Chiefs and was ambassador in Saigon. tags: - Person - MaxwellTaylor - Military - JointChiefsOfStaff - BayOfPigs - OperationMongoose - Vietnam - Counterinsurgency - SpecialGroup - PFIAB - DiemCoup - Brazil1964 updated: 2026-10-01 --- Maxwell Davenport Taylor (August 26, 1901, Keytesville, Missouri, to April 19, 1987, Walter Reed Army Medical Center) was a [United States Army](/organizations/us-army/) officer who was chief of staff of the Army from 1955 to 1959, chairman of the Cuba Study Group that examined the [Bay of Pigs](/events/bay-of-pigs/) operation in 1961, military representative of President [John F. Kennedy](/people/john-f-kennedy/) from July 1, 1961, chairman of the [Joint Chiefs of Staff](/organizations/joint-chiefs-of-staff/) from October 1, 1962, to July 1, 1964, and ambassador to South Vietnam from July 1964 to July 1965.[^1][^2][^3] He was named to the [President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board](/organizations/presidents-foreign-intelligence-advisory-board/) on May 4, 1961, while the Cuba Study Group was taking testimony, and between 1961 and 1962 he chaired the [Special Group (Augmented)](/organizations/nsc-special-group/) that oversaw [Operation Mongoose](/programs/operation-mongoose/) and the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency).[^4][^5][^6] In October 1963 copies of the [Central Intelligence Agency](/organizations/central-intelligence-agency/) Saigon station cables reporting contacts with the generals who overthrew [Ngo Dinh Diem](/people/ngo-dinh-diem/) were distributed to him by name.[^7][^8] ### Army career, 1922 to 1959 Taylor graduated fourth in a class of 102 at the United States Military Academy in 1922, receiving his diploma from the superintendent, [Douglas MacArthur](/people/douglas-macarthur/).[^1] He was commissioned in the engineers, transferred to the field artillery in 1926 and taught French and Spanish at West Point for five years. In 1935 he went to [Japan](/places/japan/) as a language officer attached to the American embassy in Tokyo, served with a Japanese artillery regiment and was then sent to [China](/places/china/) as a Japanese-speaking assistant to Colonel Joseph Stilwell, who was observing the Japanese advance. He returned to Washington in June 1939 for the last prewar class of the Army War College, and in June 1940 he was sent on a hemispheric defense mission to [Latin America](/places/latin-america/).[^1][^2] At the time of Pearl Harbor Taylor was serving in the secretariat of the Army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall. In 1942 he joined General Matthew Ridgway as chief of staff of the 82nd Division during its conversion into the Army's first airborne division, and he commanded the division's artillery in Sicily and [Italy](/places/italy/). On September 7, 1943, he went secretly behind German lines to [Rome](/places/rome/), and his judgment that an airborne landing near the city was too risky led to the cancellation of the drop. From March 1944 he commanded the 101st Airborne Division, which he led into Normandy on D-Day, in the airborne invasion of the [Holland](/places/netherlands/) and in the defense of Bastogne.[^1][^2] After the war Taylor was superintendent of West Point from September 1945, chief of staff of the European Command, the first American commander in [Berlin](/places/berlin/) and, on the Army Staff, deputy chief of staff for operations and administration. He took command of the Eighth Army in Korea on February 11, 1953, and received his fourth star on June 23, 1953. He later commanded American ground forces in Korea, Japan and Okinawa and, from April 1955, the Far East Command and the United Nations Command. He was appointed chief of staff of the Army on June 30, 1955. In that post he opposed cuts in Army strength, argued against reliance on massive nuclear retaliation, and reorganized the infantry division into the "pentomic" structure of five battle groups for the atomic battlefield; the Army under him enforced school desegregation in [Little Rock, Arkansas](/places/little-rock-arkansas/), in 1957 and landed with the Marines in [Lebanon](/places/lebanon/) in 1958. He retired in July 1959.[^2] ### Mexico, Lincoln Center and the Kennedy approach Taylor published *The Uncertain Trumpet* in 1960, arguing for a strategy of flexible response. After retiring he became chairman of the board of the Mexican Light and Power Company in [Mexico City](/places/mexico-city/). He said that he lost the post the following year when the Mexican government bought the utility, that his family left Mexico in December 1960, and that he then became president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York.[^1] Taylor said that, when the Kennedy administration came in, Secretary of State [Dean Rusk](/people/dean-rusk/) offered him the embassy in [France](/places/france/) because the President thought a military man should deal with [Charles de Gaulle](/people/charles-de-gaulle/), and that he declined. He said that the first offer from the Kennedys, made through [Robert Kennedy](/people/robert-kennedy/), had been the directorship of the CIA, which he also refused. After the landing at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy telephoned him from the White House and asked him to come to Washington the next day.[^1] ### The Cuba Study Group, April to June 1961 By a letter of April 22, 1961, Kennedy charged Taylor, with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and [Director of Central Intelligence](/organizations/director-of-central-intelligence/) [Allen Dulles](/people/allen-dulles/), to study government practices in military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity short of outright war, with particular attention to the lessons of Cuba.[^9] The first meeting was held that afternoon at Quarters Eye, the CIA building that had housed the project, and was recorded as the first meeting of "General Maxwell Taylor's Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIA." At the next session, after it was noted that the President did not regard the study as an inquiry or an investigation, the members agreed to call themselves the "Green Study Group," and Taylor had the minutes amended accordingly. The group met twenty times between April 22 and May 25, 1961; the fourteenth and nineteenth meetings are entirely classified. Witnesses included [Richard Bissell](/people/richard-bissell/), [Tracy Barnes](/people/tracy-barnes/), General David W. Gray, General [Lyman Lemnitzer](/people/lyman-lemnitzer/), Admiral Burke, [McGeorge Bundy](/people/mcgeorge-bundy/), Secretary of Defense [Robert McNamara](/people/robert-s-mcnamara/), Secretary of State Rusk, Adolf Berle, Walter Bedell Smith, José Miró Cardona, Antonio de Varona and members of the Cuban brigade. General [Edward Lansdale](/people/edward-lansdale/) testified at the eighth meeting, on May 2, 1961, at the Pentagon.[^9] On May 4, 1961, while the group was hearing testimony, Kennedy signed Executive Order 10938 establishing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with a mandate to review all functions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies and to report to the President every six months. The order had been prepared from a draft by the special assistant for national security affairs and was forwarded to the President by Robert Kennedy on April 27. [The White House](/places/white-house/) release of May 4 named the members as James R. Killian, chairman, William O. Baker, James H. Doolittle, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy and General Maxwell D. Taylor (ret.).[^5] Taylor wrote to the President from Room 2E980 of the Pentagon on June 13, 1961, that the group was ready to make its final report orally, supported by four memoranda, and that it had found no difficulty in reaching a unanimous view on all essential points. He urged prompt implementation of its first recommendation, a Strategic Resources Group with a [Cold War](/concepts/cold-war/) Indications Center, writing that the government was "losing today on many fronts."[^9] The conclusions held that a paramilitary operation the size of Zapata could not be conducted so that all American support could be "plausibly disclaimed," and that it therefore did not fit within NSC 5412/2; that by about November 1960 the impossibility of running it as a covert CIA operation should have been recognized; that the Joint Chiefs, "by acquiescing in the Zapata Plan," had given the impression of approving it although they had preferred the Trinidad plan, a point that apparently never reached the senior civilian officials; and that no failure of intelligence had contributed significantly to the defeat.[^9] The group recommended a permanent Strategic Resources Group of under-secretary rank from State, Defense and the CIA, under a full-time chairman reporting directly to the President, to replace the 5412 Committee and to review covert operations under NSC 5412/2. It recommended that any large paramilitary operation, wholly or partly covert, requiring significant numbers of militarily trained men or equipment beyond normal CIA stocks be the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense, with the CIA in a supporting role; that Defense inventory the paramilitary assets available to the [United States](/places/united-states/) "overt and covert, U.S. and foreign"; and that the Joint Chiefs be brought to feel as much responsibility for the Cold War as for conventional defense.[^9][^10] The [Church Committee](/events/church-committee/) found in 1975 that the Taylor report of June 13, 1961, made no mention of the CIA's plot against [Fidel Castro](/people/fidel-castro/) using organized crime figures. Bissell told the committee that he had not disclosed the plot because the question was never asked, because Dulles already knew, because the attempt had been called off, and because it was not germane to the failure of the invasion. Taylor, and Burke in an affidavit, told the committee that neither Bissell nor Dulles had informed them. Taylor testified on July 9, 1975, that he had never heard that underworld figures had been offered money to assassinate Castro, and that Dulles had met the board some thirty or forty times.[^4] An attachment to a memorandum of May 22, 1961, from [FBI](/organizations/federal-bureau-of-investigation/) Director [J. Edgar Hoover](/people/j-edgar-hoover/) to the Attorney General, concerning the [Las Vegas](/places/las-vegas/) wiretap, quoted [Sheffield Edwards](/people/sheffield-edwards/) of the CIA as saying that Bissell, "in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General," had told the Attorney General "that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro." Bissell told the committee that he had no recollection of briefing the two except as members of the board, that any such conversation was not before the board, and that the memorandum quoted language "I might very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro."[^4] ### Military representative of the President, 1961 to 1962 The White House announced on June 26, 1961, that Taylor would become the President's military representative on July 1. An editorial clipping preserved by the CIA quotes the announcement as giving him "the responsibility of watching the function of the intelligence apparatus of the government to assure the President that it meets the future needs of the government," and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service recorded the New China News Agency's report of the appointment the next day.[^11] The Church Committee records, from his testimony and McGeorge Bundy's, that Taylor served as military representative and intelligence adviser until he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs.[^6] When Kennedy chose [John McCone](/people/john-mccone/) as Director of Central Intelligence in September 1961, Bundy reported to the President on September 28 that Killian was talking of resigning from the intelligence board and that some members had sharp past disagreements with McCone. Bundy wrote that "General Taylor has talked to Bobby about this and probably is trying to calm Killian down," and that Bundy himself had talked to the columnist Joseph Alsop, who would write a helpful column.[^12] ### The Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam, October 1961 A memorandum for the record of October 11, 1961, planned for Taylor to leave for South Vietnam with Walt Rostow of the White House, General Lansdale, a representative of the Joint Chiefs and an official of the State Department, on a mission to be announced at the President's press conference as an economic survey, and to examine the feasibility of the military intervention plan discussed that morning. The mission arrived in Saigon on October 18, just as Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed a state of emergency.[^13] In an eyes-only cable to the President, sent from Baguio in the [Philippines](/places/philippines/), Taylor argued for a task force in the Mekong delta consisting mainly of army engineers to work in a flooded area, warned that it would have to conduct some combat operations and take casualties, and held that the rest of the program would be insufficient without it, because the United States had to "convince Diem that we are willing to join him in a showdown with the Viet Cong."[^13] McNamara recommended the program on November 8; on November 11 Rusk and McNamara jointly recommended deferring combat units, and the presidential decision followed their paper.[^13] ### The Special Group (Augmented) and Operation Mongoose Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman of the Special Group (Augmented), created to oversee Operation Mongoose, with Lansdale as chief of operations and [William Harvey](/people/william-harvey/) in charge of the CIA's Task Force W. The Church Committee lists its members as the regular members of the Special Group, McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone and General Lemnitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and Taylor; Rusk and McNamara sometimes attended.[^6] A memorandum for the record of October 5, 1961, by Thomas Parrott, secretary of the Special Group, recorded that a plan was wanted "against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene," that the presence of Raúl Castro and [Che Guevara](/people/che-guevara/) had to be taken into account, and that Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned" to the assistant secretary of state concerned. Parrott also asked Tracy Barnes at the CIA for a report on what was being planned "on the covert side." Taylor testified that he had no recollection of National Security Action Memorandum 100, the related order, and that "never at any time" did he raise assassination with Parrott or anyone else.[^14] In early April 1962 Harvey reactivated the CIA's contact with John Rosselli, and the poison pills were passed in that month. On May 3, 1962, Harvey reported to the Special Group (Augmented) on agent teams without mention of the Rosselli operation. Shortly afterwards Taylor gave the President what he called a "routine briefing," recorded in his memorandum for the record of May 7, 1962, which makes no reference to Harvey's contacts with Rosselli or the delivery of pills and guns.[^6] On the same day, May 7, 1962, Sheffield Edwards and the CIA's general counsel, [Lawrence Houston](/people/lawrence-houston/), briefed Robert Kennedy on the earlier underworld operation. Houston had asked the [Justice Department](/organizations/department-of-justice/) in April not to prosecute those involved in the Las Vegas wiretap, among them [Robert Maheu](/people/robert-maheu/), "on grounds of security"; the Church Committee found that the CIA's objection avoided "exposure of Giancana's and Rosselli's involvement with the Agency in an assassination plot."[^15] At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Rusk's office on August 10, 1962, according to a memorandum by Harvey of August 14, McNamara raised the question of assassinating Castro, and it was "the obvious consensus" that the subject was not one to be made a matter of official record. Lansdale's action memorandum of August 13 assigned to Harvey papers on subjects "including liquidation of leaders," words that Harvey excised. Parrott's minutes contain no reference to assassination.[^16] On August 20 Taylor told the President that the group saw no likelihood that Castro's government would be overturned by internal means without direct American military intervention, and that it favored a more aggressive Mongoose program.[^6] Taylor testified that a plan to assassinate Castro was never submitted to the group, orally or in writing, that the group was never told of the pills given to Rosselli in April 1962, and that the President and the Attorney General "would never have gone around" the group to plan an assassination. He said that Robert Kennedy dealt directly with Lansdale outside the group's channels "only for the purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency." Bundy told the committee that Robert Kennedy and Taylor had "a relation of real trust and confidence."[^6] ### The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) National Security Action Memorandum 124 of January 18, 1962, created the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). A CIA record of March 26, 1962, lists its members as the military representative of the President, as chairman, the Attorney General, the deputy under secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the special assistant for national security affairs, the administrator of the [Agency for International Development](/organizations/agency-for-international-development/) and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs; NSAM 180 of August 13, 1962, added the director of the [United States Information Agency](/organizations/united-states-information-agency/).[^17] National Security Action Memorandum 204 of November 7, 1962, states, "Since General Taylor has taken up his duties as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," that the [Department of State](/organizations/state-department/) would chair the group, with Michael V. Forrestal as the White House member.[^18] Taylor remained engaged with the group as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A CIA note for the deputy director of November 23, 1963, the day after the President's assassination, records that in response to a recent letter from Taylor to the members of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research had asked for national intelligence estimates giving "a comprehensive assessment related to the internal defense situation" in the [Dominican Republic](/places/dominican-republic/) and [Honduras](/places/honduras/). The same note records that the office of the chairman, concerned that extremists of right and left might eliminate the center in Italy, had asked through the [Defense Intelligence Agency](/organizations/defense-intelligence-agency/) for an estimate on Italy.[^19] ### Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 1962. Two weeks later the United States obtained the first definite evidence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Taylor sat on the Executive Committee of the [National Security Council](/organizations/national-security-council/), and, speaking for the Chiefs, recommended air strikes, a naval quarantine and preparation for an invasion. In August 1963 he persuaded the Chiefs to endorse the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[^2] ### Vietnam, August to November 1963 Taylor attended the White House meetings of August 28, 1963, held after the pagoda raids, and reported that Vietnamese forces loyal to Diem in the Saigon area outnumbered two to one those expected to follow rebel generals in a coup, while outside Saigon the generals who might rebel commanded more troops. That evening the President announced that Taylor would ask General Paul Harkins for his personal assessment of the situation and of the generals' plans.[^20] On August 30 Taylor sent the President, as memorandum CM-856-63, a table of the probable loyalties of military units and commanders "in the event a coup d'etat is undertaken," based, except for the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, on a CIA report received from Saigon on August 29. It rated the Presidential Guard most likely to remain loyal, the airborne brigade as one that "could likely be led to act against Diem," and the Special Forces under Colonel Le Quang Tung as probably standing by Diem.[^21] Taylor said in 1981 that the State Department telegram of August 24, 1963, which authorized Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to tell the generals that the United States could not continue to support the government unless the Nhus were removed, had been drafted by Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman and Michael Forrestal, cleared with Under Secretary [George Ball](/people/george-ball/) "who was out playing golf," cleared by telephone with the President at Hyannis Port, and dispatched "without the concurrence of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the CIA," and that its authors could not explain it the following Monday.[^1] In his memoirs he called it an "end run"; Hilsman maintained that the President and representatives of all the agencies concerned had cleared it.[^22] On September 19 Taylor recorded a call from the former ambassador Tran Van Chuong, who told him there could be no final victory with the Diem government and that it would be too dangerous for senior civilians to communicate with him.[^23] Kennedy sent McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam in late September. Taylor played tennis with General Duong Van Minh at the Saigon Officers Club on September 29, with McNamara as a spectator, under the impression that Minh had a message for them; Minh declined to respond to what Taylor later called "broad hints of our interest in other subjects which we gave him during breaks in the game." At Taylor's request Colonel Raymond Jones contacted Minh that night. On October 1 Taylor paid a farewell call on Minh, recording that Minh saw "his country in chains with no way to shake them off," and telling him that he could always communicate with Taylor on any subject through General Harkins.[^8] Taylor wrote to Diem on October 1 as "an old friend of South Vietnam," predicting that the insurgency in the north and center could be reduced to sporadic incidents by the end of 1964 and the Delta by the end of 1965 if conditions were met; a note on the copy records delivery on October 2 with McNamara's approval and Lodge's concurrence.[^24] The McNamara-Taylor report of October 2 recommended announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 military personnel by the end of 1963 and of the bulk of them by the end of 1965, continuing to withhold commodity import funds, suspending the AID loans for the Saigon-Cholon waterworks and the Saigon electric power project, and cutting off MAP and CIA support to Colonel Tung's units unless they were placed under the Joint General Staff. It held that "no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government," and, under possible American actions, that there was a need for "an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects."[^25] The CIA station's cable 1385 of October 3, reporting that Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein had met General Tran Van Don at Nha Trang the night before with the approval of the deputy chief of mission, and that Minh wished to see Conein privately, was sent to the State Department exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman and Hilsman, to the White House for Bundy, and to the Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence "exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak."[^7] Minh received Conein on October 5 and outlined three plans, the first being the assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can with Diem kept in office.[^26] The station's cable 2023 of October 29, on Conein's meeting with Don the day before, which listed units in the coup group and described two escape tunnels from Gia Long Palace, went to the Office of the Secretary of Defense "eyes only for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy," to McCone, Carter and [Helms](/people/richard-helms/) at the CIA, and to the State Department and White House.[^27] On October 29 Taylor sent Harkins message JCS 4188-63 on a "continued lack of effective communication" between Harkins and Lodge and on divergent understandings of Washington's coup guidance. Harkins replied the next day, "I share your concern," and complained that Lodge did not clear military messages with him; Taylor had the reply conveyed to Bundy.[^28][^29] The Church Committee records that Harkins cabled Taylor his opposition to American participation in a coup.[^30] At the President's meeting of 4:20 p.m. on October 29, attended by the Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, McCone, Harriman, Helms, [William Colby](/people/william-colby/) and others, Colby estimated pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces at about 9,800 each, with 18,000 neutral. Taylor cautioned against looking at the situation "as if it were a football game." McNamara proposed that the deputy chief of mission, the acting CIA chief and Harkins jointly decide what "our agent Conein" would say and do; McCone disagreed. Robert Kennedy called his own position against a coup "the minority view." Taylor said he agreed with the Attorney General and, pressed by the President, said that even a successful coup would slow the war because the new central government would be inexperienced and the province chiefs appointed by Diem would probably be replaced. McCone said he agreed with Taylor.[^31] Taylor attended the President's meetings on the morning of November 1, as the coup began, and of 9:35 a.m. on November 2, when Forrestal brought in a telegram reporting that Diem and Nhu were dead.[^32] Taylor said in 1981 that "we were meeting in the Cabinet room when the news came, and President Kennedy, who always had insisted Diem never suffer more than exile, jumped up and rushed out of the room." In his memoir he placed the scene on November 1, a date the editors of the Foreign Relations series correct to November 2.[^1][^32] Asked in 1981 whether the killing of Diem had been a covert operation, Taylor answered, "Not if you mean a covert operation conducted by the CIA."[^1] At 12:25 p.m. on November 2 Taylor cabled Harkins about the risk that the new government would make a wholesale replacement of the province chiefs, writing that "it is clearly in our interest to prevent removal of effective and experienced chiefs."[^33] The Church Committee found that the United States had encouraged the coup but was neither involved in nor desired the deaths of Diem and Nhu.[^30] ### Brazil, March 1964 The cable of March 27, 1964, cited as RIOD 3824 and slugged RYBAT, in which Ambassador [Lincoln Gordon](/people/lincoln-gordon/) reported from Rio de Janeiro on the situation in [Brazil](/places/brazil/), was addressed for immediate passage to Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, Ralph Burton, Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary John McNaughton, "General Maxwell Taylor," CIA Director McCone, Colonel [J.C. King](/people/jc-king/), [Desmond FitzGerald](/people/desmond-fitzgerald/), the White House for Bundy and Ralph Dungan, and General O'Meara in the Canal Zone, "other distribution only by approval above named." Gordon wrote that the movement around General [Humberto Castelo Branco](/people/humberto-castelo-branco/) was where "both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed." He recommended preparing a clandestine delivery of arms "of non-US origin" to Castelo Branco's supporters in São Paulo, the "best delivery means now apparent to us" being an "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos," with petroleum supplies, and the early detachment of a naval task force with carrier aircraft to within a few days' steaming of Santos.[^34] ### Ambassador in Saigon, 1964 to 1965 President [Lyndon B. Johnson](/people/lyndon-b-johnson/) appointed Taylor ambassador to South Vietnam on July 1, 1964, the day he left the chairmanship; he presented his credentials on July 14 and left post on July 30, 1965, with U. Alexis Johnson as deputy ambassador.[^2][^3] On the night of December 19 to 20, 1964, General Nguyen Khanh and the officers known as the Young Turks, among them Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, dissolved the High National Council by a "Military Council Decree No. 1" and arrested some of its members. Taylor told Prime Minister Tran Van Huong that accepting the decree would leave "a military dictatorship with only a civilian facade" and could jeopardize continued American support, and proposed conditions Huong should exact; William Bundy cabled, "Entirely agree with line you are taking."[^35] On December 23 Taylor reported that Khanh's military colleagues "would have dropped him except for the understanding that he had U.S. support," and named Generals Nguyen Huu Co, Pham Van Dong and Thieu as possible replacements, excluding Minh.[^36] The State Department's instructions of December 24, for the contingency that Taylor might be declared persona non grata, expressed the hope that Huong and the military "would in end unite on dumping Khanh as their own decision."[^37] On February 19, 1965, Taylor reported a coup attempt led tactically by General Lam Van Phat, with information coming "largely from CAS officer in contact with liaison officer" of Tran Van Don.[^38] On February 23 the State Department told Taylor that it expected the next air strike against North Vietnam on February 26 and that "we believe departure of Khanh essential before either clearance or strike."[^39] Khanh left Saigon on February 25; Taylor reported to the President on March 2 the "perceptible feeling of relief" at his departure.[^40] ### Adviser, IDA and the intelligence board, 1965 to 1969 After resigning as ambassador, Taylor served as a special consultant to President Johnson and on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; he was president of the Institute for Defense Analyses from 1966 to 1969.[^1][^2] A CIA list of May 1966 names him among the board's members under [Clark Clifford](/people/clark-clifford/), with William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, William Langer, Edwin H. Land, Robert Murphy and Frank Pace.[^41] CIA records of 1967 and 1968 show the agency arranging a briefing for him with the [National Security Agency](/organizations/nsa/) on July 19, 1967, and briefing him on the [Middle East](/places/middle-east/), on Soviet technology through the Foreign Technology Division, and on a special estimate of the ability to monitor Soviet arms limitations. The record of the director's meeting of November 30, 1967, notes that Taylor had requested an April 11, 1968, briefing on strategic offensive systems and that the CIA was to brief the board on espionage and counterespionage operations in Vietnam at its meeting of December 11 and 12.[^42] Taylor published *Responsibility and Response* in 1967, the memoir *Swords and Plowshares* in 1972 and *Precarious Security* in 1976. He died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on April 19, 1987.[^1][^2] [^1]: Robert S. Gallagher, "Gen. Maxwell Taylor: Memories of Peace and War" (interview with Maxwell D. Taylor), *American Heritage*, vol. 32, no. 3 (April/May 1981), https://www.americanheritage.com/gen-maxwell-taylor-memories-peace-and-war [^2]: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "General Maxwell Davenport Taylor," from *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-2016* (2016), https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Maxwell-Davenport-Taylor/ [^3]: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Maxwell Davenport Taylor (1901-1987)," Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/taylor-maxwell-davenport [^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465, 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 1975, section III.B.3(b)(i)(4)(c), "Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs Inquiry," pp. 121-123, and (ii)(1)(a), p. 135, citing testimony of Taylor, July 9, 1975, pp. 72-73, and of Bissell, June 9, June 11 and July 22, 1975, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^5]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, *Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters*, document 87, editorial note on Executive Order 10938 and the White House release of May 4, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d87 [^6]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, section III.B.3(b)(ii)(2)-(3), "Operation MONGOOSE" and "Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials," pp. 139-140, 153-157, citing testimony of Taylor, July 9, 1975, pp. 11-12, 27, 41-49, 62, 67, Bundy, July 11, 1975, and Taylor's memoranda to the President of May 7 and August 20, 1962, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^7]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 171, CIA Saigon station telegram 1385, October 3, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d171 [^8]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 162, memorandum for the record by Taylor, "Farewell Call on Major General Duong Van Minh," October 1, 1963, and source note quoting Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, pp. 297-298, and Taylor to McNamara, September 30, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d162 [^9]: Maxwell D. Taylor to President Kennedy, June 13, 1961; Memorandum No. 3, "Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group," and Memorandum No. 4, "Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group," Recommendations 1 to 4; and memoranda for the record of the first, second and eighth meetings (April 22, April 24 and May 2, 1961), in *Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981), contents, pp. 1-3, 40-50, 183-184, https://archive.org/details/operation-zapata [^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Taylor Report," August 15, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R001900160002-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001900160002-5 [^11]: Unsigned editorial clipping on the appointment of Gen. Maxwell Taylor as military representative of the President, 1961, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200130138-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp70-00058r000200130138-3; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Maxwell Taylor Named Kennedy Aide," Peking NCNA in English, June 27, 1961, in daily report of June 28, 1961, CIA-RDP75-00149R000700480016-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700480016-9 [^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, document 91, McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, "Washington News," September 28, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d91 [^13]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, Book 2, Part IV.B.1, "Evolution of the War: The Kennedy Program and Commitments, 1961," sections "The Decision to Send Taylor" and "Taylor in Saigon," including the memorandum for the record of October 11, 1961, and Taylor's eyes-only cables from Baguio, DTIC ADA542557, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557 [^14]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, section III.B.3(b)(ii)(1)(b), "National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence Estimate," pp. 136-138, citing Parrott memorandum for the record, October 5, 1961, and Taylor testimony, July 9, 1975, pp. 18-19, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^15]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, section III.B.3(b)(i)(7)(c)(2), "The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution" and "Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7, 1962," pp. 131-133, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^16]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, section III.B.3(b)(ii)(4), "The August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) Meeting," pp. 161-163, citing Harvey memorandum to Helms, August 14, 1962, and Lansdale memorandum, August 13, 1962, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Membership of Special Group, Counter Insurgency (According to NSAM 124, 18 Jan 62)," March 26, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120022-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01083a000100120022-8 [^18]: National Security Action Memorandum No. 204, "Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)," November 7, 1962, revised, with Bromley Smith's memorandum to holders of November 16, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110008-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r000100110008-3 [^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Notes for DDCI," November 23, 1963, item 5, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300100074-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001300100074-8 [^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, *Vietnam, August-December 1963*, document 1, memorandum of conference with the President, August 28, 1963, noon, and document 6, memorandum of conversation, August 28, 1963, 6 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d1 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d6 [^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 24, Taylor to the President, CM-856-63, "Probable Loyalties of Vietnamese Units and Commanders," August 30, 1963, with enclosure, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d24 [^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. III, *Vietnam, January-August 1963*, document 281, telegram 243 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 24, 1963, source note citing Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, pp. 292-294, and Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 487-488, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d281 [^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 135, memorandum for the record by Taylor, "Visit of Former Ambassador Tran Van Chuong," September 19, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d135 [^24]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 163, Taylor to President Diem, October 1, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d163 [^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 167, Taylor and McNamara to the President, "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam," October 2, 1963, sections I.A-B and VIII.C, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d167 [^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 177, CIA Saigon station telegram, October 5, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d177 [^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 225, CIA Saigon station telegram 2023, October 29, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d225 [^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 227, Taylor to Harkins, JCS 4188-63, October 29, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227 [^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 240, Harkins to Taylor, MAC 2028, October 30, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d240 [^30]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, section III.E, "Diem," pp. 217-224, https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit [^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 234, memorandum of conference with President Kennedy, October 29, 1963, 4:20 p.m., drafted by Bromley Smith, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d234 [^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 264, telegram 673 to Saigon, November 1, 1963, source note on the 10 a.m. meeting, and document 274, editorial note on the meeting of November 2, 1963, 9:35 a.m., quoting Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 301, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d264 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d274 [^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 276, Taylor to Harkins, JCS 4279-63, November 2, 1963, 12:25 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d276 [^34]: Telegram RIOD 3824, personal from Ambassador Gordon, March 27, 1964, sections one to four of five (LBJ Library copy), paragraphs 1, 11, 13 and 14, posted as document 2 of National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 118, "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup," https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/bz02.pdf [^35]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, *Vietnam, 1964*, document 451, Saigon telegram 1870, December 20, 1964, 5 p.m., and document 452, Saigon telegram 1874, December 20, 1964, 7 p.m., with source notes, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d451 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d452 [^36]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 460, Saigon telegram 1915, December 23, 1964, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d460 [^37]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 465, telegram 1347 to Saigon, December 24, 1964, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d465 [^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. II, *Vietnam, January-June 1965*, document 141, Saigon telegram 2654, February 19, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d141 [^39]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. II, document 159, telegram 1805 to Saigon, February 23, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d159 [^40]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. II, document 177, Saigon telegram 2817, March 2, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d177 [^41]: Central Intelligence Agency, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," membership list, May 1966, CIA-RDP71R00140A000100030002-1, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp71r00140a000100030002-1 [^42]: Central Intelligence Agency, memoranda for the record of the Director's morning meetings, August 31, 1967 (CIA-RDP80R01284A001800030023-0), November 30, 1967 (CIA-RDP80R01284A001800030085-2), April 1, 1968 (CIA-RDP80R01284A001800040059-0), May 29, 1968 (CIA-RDP80R01284A001800050019-3) and August 21, 1968 (CIA-RDP80R01284A001800050076-0); memorandum for the record, "Briefing of General Maxwell Taylor, 19 July 1967," July 13, 1967 (CIA-RDP33-02415A000100030079-0); all at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01284a001800030085-2 and the corresponding identifiers