--- alias: - John J. McCloy - John McCloy - John Jay McCloy - John Snader McCloy - Jack McCloy - J.J. McCloy born: 1895-03-31 category: Key Figures created: 2026-10-01 died: 1989-03-11 location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (born); Stamford, Connecticut (died) relations: - fn: 1 role: husband start: 1930-04-25 type: spouse_of with: '[[Ellen Zinsser McCloy]]' - end: 1940-12 fn: 1 role: associate, partner from 1929 start: 1924-12 type: employed_by with: '[[Cravath, Swaine & Moore]]' - end: 1945-11 fn: 1 role: special assistant, then Assistant Secretary of War start: 1940-12 type: employed_by with: '[[United States Department of War]]' - end: 1945-11 fn: 1 role: assistant to the Secretary of War start: 1940-12 type: reported_to with: '[[Henry L. Stimson]]' - end: 1949-06-30 fn: 11 role: president start: 1947-03-17 type: head_of with: '[[World Bank]]' - fn: 12 reverse: true role: High Commissioner for Germany start: 1949 type: appointed with: '[[Harry S. Truman]]' - end: 1952-08-01 fn: 13 role: U.S. High Commissioner for Germany start: 1949-09-21 type: head_of with: '[[Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany]]' - fn: 16 role: chairman of the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals start: 1950-03 type: appointed with: '[[David W. Peck]]' - end: 1965 fn: 22 role: chairman of the board of trustees type: director_of with: '[[Ford Foundation]]' - end: 1971 fn: 1 role: chairman start: 1953 type: head_of with: '[[Council on Foreign Relations]]' - end: 1960-12 fn: 1 role: chairman of the board of Chase National, later Chase Manhattan start: 1953-01 type: director_of with: '[[Chase Manhattan Bank]]' - end: 1947 fn: 1 role: partner start: 1946 type: employed_by with: '[[Milbank Tweed]]' - end: 1989 fn: 1 role: name partner start: 1961 type: employed_by with: '[[Milbank Tweed]]' - end: 1974 fn: 1 role: chairman start: 1961 type: head_of with: '[[General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[ExxonMobil]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[Mobil]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[Gulf Oil]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[Texaco]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[Standard Oil of California]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[BP]]' - fn: 29 role: counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies type: represented with: '[[Royal Dutch Shell]]' - fn: 34 role: counsel to whom the Business Review letters were addressed start: 1971-01 type: participant_in with: '[[Libyan Producers Agreement]]' - end: 1963 fn: 1 role: chairman of the Coordinating Committee start: 1962-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Cuban Missile Crisis]]' - fn: 50 role: commissioner start: 1963-11-29 type: participant_in with: '[[Warren Commission]]' summary: American lawyer, Assistant Secretary of War, World Bank president, High Commissioner for Germany, Chase and Ford Foundation chairman, counsel to the major oil companies and Warren Commission member. tags: - Person - JohnJMcCloy - MilbankTweed - HICOG - ChaseManhattan - FordFoundation - CouncilOnForeignRelations - WorldBank - WarrenCommission - OilIndustry - SevenSisters - JapaneseInternment - ArmsControl - ColdWar updated: 2026-10-01 --- John Jay McCloy (born in Philadelphia on March 31, 1895; died in Stamford, Connecticut, on March 11, 1989) was an American lawyer, banker and government official. He served as Assistant Secretary of War, president of the World Bank, U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for [Germany](/places/germany/), chairman of the [Chase Manhattan Bank](/organizations/chase-manhattan-bank/), the Ford Foundation and the [Council on Foreign Relations](/organizations/council-on-foreign-relations/), counsel to the major international oil companies, chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament and a member of the [Warren Commission](/events/warren-commission/). Amherst College, which holds his papers, records his name at birth as John McCloy, with "Snader" used as a middle name in college records until about 1935 and "Jay" thereafter.[^1] ### Black Tom and the Stimson Connection McCloy joined Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood in December 1924 and became a partner in 1929.[^1] The firm represented the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company in the Black Tom case, a World War I sabotage case that began in 1916 when a munitions depot on Black Tom Island in New York was blown up; McCloy became involved in 1930 and saw the case through to its final settlement in 1941. The proceedings ran before the Mixed Claims Commission (August 1924 to July 1941), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (October 1939 to October 1940) and the Supreme Court of the United States (August 1940 to January 1941). The archivists who processed his papers wrote that the case reportedly brought him to the attention of Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State and later Secretary of War, who appointed him Assistant Secretary of War.[^2] McCloy served Stimson as an expert consultant from October 1940, as Special Assistant from December 1940 and as Assistant Secretary of War from April 1941 to November 1945.[^1] ### Assistant Secretary of War and the Japanese American Exclusion After the outbreak of war McCloy was the civilian aide to Stimson responsible for Japanese American questions.[^3] In the first weeks of 1942 he took part in the discussions among the War Department, the Western Defense Command and the [Department of Justice](/organizations/department-of-justice/) that preceded Executive Order 9066. Provost Marshal General Allen W. Gullion described a heated meeting over a draft press release, which stated that the military situation did not require the removal of American citizens of Japanese descent, between Stimson, McCloy and Karl Bendetsen for the War Department and Attorney General Francis Biddle, [J. Edgar Hoover](/people/j-edgar-hoover/) and James Rowe for the Justice Department; Stimson and McCloy wanted General John L. DeWitt to consider the draft before they responded. On February 3, 1942, DeWitt read McCloy by telephone the memorandum he had promised Gullion and urged deletion of the line stating that citizens need not be removed. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians wrote that McCloy "was most concerned about the legality of any government action," that he favored designating restricted zones and letting people back in by permit, that he would allow in "[e]veryone but the Japs," and that he did not press DeWitt for a military justification for moving the Nisei. On February 4 he met Gullion, Rowe, Edward Ennis and John Burling on legislation to remove both citizens and aliens from parts of the West Coast. On February 18, 1942, he attended the conference at which Stimson approved Biddle's draft of the executive order; Stimson wrote in his diary that "Biddle, McCloy and Gullion had done a good piece of work in breaking down the issues between the Departments the night before."[^3] McCloy took Milton Eisenhower to [San Francisco](/places/san-francisco/) to meet DeWitt before [Franklin D. Roosevelt](/people/franklin-d-roosevelt/) signed Executive Order 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority on March 18, 1942. When evacuees were being forced to sell their holdings, he wrote Harry Hopkins that "[o]ne of the drawbacks they have is the loss of their property," and an exchange with Justice Felix Frankfurter ended with Frankfurter assuring him that he was handling a delicate matter with wisdom and appropriate hard-headedness.[^4] In January 1943 McCloy assured DeWitt that the new loyalty review for Nisei volunteers would not affect exclusion from the West Coast. On April 8, 1943, he wrote DeWitt that "[t]he very 'entering wedge' which you appear to dread is precisely what must be accomplished." The same month he told Bendetsen, in a discussion of how the original exclusion decision had been reached: "We never thought about it." When DeWitt's printed Final Report on the evacuation reached him in mid-April 1943, McCloy found it "too self-glorifying and too self-serving," objecting above all to its statement that the impossibility of determining loyalty, not urgency, had been the military necessity for exclusion. Bendetsen carried McCloy's revisions to DeWitt in Alaska, after which DeWitt accepted them and set out to destroy every copy of the April version. A Bendetsen memorandum of the period records that McCloy concluded there "no longer existed any military necessity for the continued exclusion of all Japanese from the evacuated zone," and that the War Department "of its own motion, would not take any action to direct or require the revision or revocation of present restrictions." In early November 1944, a week after General Charles H. Bonesteel of the Western Defense Command asked him for a personal meeting on ending exclusion, McCloy wrote that "there is a disposition not to crowd action too closely upon the heels of the election."[^5] McCloy and Bendetsen, the two witnesses before the commission most involved in the evacuation decision, testified that it was not taken on the basis of actual incidents of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity. The commission concluded that the War Department had "failed to scrutinize General DeWitt's demands closely and critically."[^3] From 1947 to 1949 McCloy supported legislation to accept evacuation claims and to grant naturalization rights to Japanese residents not born in the [United States](/places/united-states/). He opposed the compensation effort that followed the commission's 1983 report and prepared testimony for the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations in 1984 to 1986.[^6] In 1953 the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act (the Jenner Committee), headed by Senator William E. Jenner, issued a report referring to "Army tolerance of Communists" during the war and quoting McCloy's 1945 testimony to the House Committee on Military Affairs. On February 7, 1954, Senator [Joseph McCarthy](/people/joseph-mccarthy/) accused McCloy of having ordered the destruction of Army intelligence files on Communists, and retracted the charge two days later while insisting that McCloy had been the "moving force" behind the commissioning of Communists in the Army. In 1952 Secretary of State [Dean Acheson](/people/dean-acheson/) named McCloy to a special panel on the loyalty case of the Foreign Service officer John Carter Vincent, with Judge Learned Hand, former Assistant Secretaries of State James Grafton Rogers and G. Howland Chase, and a former ambassador printed in the finding aid as Edmund C. Wilson; [John Foster Dulles](/people/john-foster-dulles/) asked the panel to stop work after the change of administration.[^7] ### The Auschwitz Letters In the summer and fall of 1944 the World Jewish Congress and the War Refugee Board forwarded requests to the War Department to bomb Auschwitz. On August 14, 1944, McCloy advised that "such an operation could be executed only by the diversion of considerable air support ... now engaged in decisive operations elsewhere and would in any case be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not warrant the use of our resources." Within a week the United States Army Air Forces carried out a heavy bombing of the I.G. Farben synthetic oil and rubber (Buna) works near Auschwitz III, less than five miles from the Auschwitz-Birkenau killing center.[^8] On November 18, 1944, answering a letter of November 8 from John W. Pehle, executive director of the War Refugee Board, which forwarded the report of two eyewitnesses on Auschwitz and Birkenau, McCloy wrote that "[t]he Operation Staff of the War Department has given careful consideration to your suggestion." He listed five points, among them that the target was beyond the maximum range of medium bombers, dive bombers and fighter bombers in the [United Kingdom](/places/united-kingdom/), France or Italy, that heavy bombers from British bases would face a "hazardous round trip flight unescorted of approximately 2,000 miles over enemy territory," and that "our strategic air forces are engaged in the destruction of industrial target systems vital to the dwindling war potential of the enemy, from which they should not be diverted." He added: "I know that you have been reluctant to press this activity on the War Department. We have been pressed strongly from other quarters, however, and have taken the best military opinion on its feasibility."[^9] ### The Strategic Services Unit A CIA historical index card dated December 21, 1965 summarizes two memoranda on the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU): one from Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson of September 27, 1945, implementing an executive order of September 20 and designating a War Department representative to administer, operate and liquidate the unit "under authority and policies to be determined by Asst SecWar," and one from McCloy of September 26, 1945, instructing him to examine the unit's facilities to determine their disposition, coordinate with the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget, "preserve SSU functions of peacetime value" and follow War Department fiscal procedures. The card's compiler commented that while the SSU director had the mission to liquidate wartime activities and preserve functions suitable for peacetime, "SSU itself appears to be without any operational mission." The name of the designated representative is withheld in the released card.[^10] ### World Bank and the High Commissionership McCloy practiced with Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley in 1946 and 1947.[^1] He was the second president of the World Bank, from March 17, 1947 to June 30, 1949; during his tenure the Bank began to borrow in the capital market and made its first reconstruction and development loans, and he proposed his associate Eugene R. Black as his successor.[^11] At a meeting on April 30, 1949, [Harry S. Truman](/people/harry-s-truman/) asked him to become High Commissioner for Germany, and he resigned from the Bank on May 18, 1949.[^12] The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) was established on September 21, 1949, with the creation of the Federal Republic, and McCloy, its first High Commissioner, served until August 1, 1952; the Amherst chronology dates his tenure as Military Governor and High Commissioner from July 1949 to July 1952.[^13] [^1] On August 18, 1949, [Director of Central Intelligence](/organizations/director-of-central-intelligence/) Roscoe Hillenkoetter wrote McCloy that a change in the payment of German employees of American units in Germany had affected "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency unit in Germany, the Department of the Army Detachment," and requested that McCloy allot to the detachment, "from the German reparations account," a sum (withheld in the released copy) per year for the salaries of German service personnel who had worked with the CIA unit since the occupation. Hillenkoetter wrote that the Agency had no provision in its budget to carry them and that it wished "to do all possible to aid you in every way you may desire to carry out the aims of your mission."[^14] On January 12, 1951, Director Walter Bedell Smith answered a McCloy letter of December 12, 1950 concerning his talks with a person whose name is withheld, writing that "Bill, Allen Dulles and I are doing the best we can." On June 19, 1951, Deputy Director [Allen Dulles](/people/allen-dulles/) returned to McCloy a paper he had handed Dulles the night before, keeping a copy, and promised the Agency's views on its recommendations.[^15] ### The Landsberg Clemency Decisions McCloy appointed an Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals in March 1950 to review petitions from prisoners convicted by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals and held at Landsberg Prison. Its members were David W. Peck, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York Supreme Court (chairman); Frederick A. Moran, chairman of the New York Board of Parole; and Brigadier General Conrad E. Snow, Assistant Legal Adviser of the [Department of State](/organizations/state-department/). The board began in Washington, established itself in Munich in July 1950, sat there for forty days, read the judgments in the cases of 104 defendants and heard 50 counsel representing 90 of them. On January 31, 1951, McCloy announced his decisions: of fifteen death sentences, ten were commuted and five confirmed, four against leaders of the SS Einsatzgruppen and one against the former head of the concentration camp administration (WVHA).[^16] In the Krupp case (Case 10), McCloy wrote that the guilt of the defendants "was no greater in these cases than that involved in the Farben and Flick cases" and reduced the sentences "so that the terms served will conform approximately to the sentences in similar cases." The decisions, as printed by his office, were: Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, "from 12 years and confiscation of all property to time served and no confiscation"; Friedrich von Buelow and Erich Mueller, from twelve years to time served; Eduard Houdremont and Friedrich Janssen, from ten years to time served; Karl Eberhardt and Max Ihn, from nine years to time served; and Heinrich Korschan and Heinrich Lehmann, from six years to time served. McCloy described the confiscation decree as "the sole case of confiscation decreed against any defendant by the Nuremberg courts," wrote that he could "find no personal guilt in defendant Krupp, based upon the charges in this case, sufficient to distinguish him above all others sentenced by the Nuremberg Courts," and added that he was "making no judgments as to the ultimate title to the former Krupp property," which "will be subject to AHC Law Number 27, 'Reorganization of the German Coal, Iron and Steel Industries,' and is not affected by this decision."[^17] In the Ministries case he approved the board's reduction of the sentence of Gottlob Berger, a close associate of [Heinrich Himmler](/people/heinrich-himmler/), from twenty-five years to ten, and noted that he had already commuted the sentence of Ernst von Weizsäcker to time served. The announcement made no mention of the Flick and Farben cases, because all of the defendants in them had been released or were eligible for release.[^18] On May 9, 1952, reporting to the State Department on meetings with coalition party leaders over the contractual agreements ending the occupation, McCloy wrote that leaders of the German Party "recommended inter alia early release of war criminals of type of Manstein and Kesselring as gesture of good will," and that he had "gained impression that DP and FDP objections to war criminal provisions were not really fundamental and that review board procedure, if instituted at an early date, wld placate them."[^19] ### Klaus Barbie and the Cables over McCloy's Name Cables from the High Commission concerning Klaus Barbie went out over McCloy's name; Allan A. Ryan, in his 1983 report to the Attorney General, wrote that this followed the State Department practice by which embassy cables carry the ambassador's name, and that "[o]ne cannot infer from this practice that the ambassador or other signatory actually read or knew about the cable." In June 1950, after a French note of May 5 demanding Barbie's surrender, Deputy Political Adviser E. Allan Lightner wrote that McCloy had decided to "smoke out EUCOM on the matter to see how far they would go in helping to find this character, and to get more details as to just how embarrassing it would be to them (CIC) if he were turned over to the French." On June 16, 1950, Benjamin Shute, director of HICOG's Office of Intelligence, was told at European Command headquarters in Heidelberg that the Counter Intelligence Corps had ended Barbie's employment on May 24, 1949 and had kept in contact with him until late April 1950. Ryan found that "[t]hese representations by CIC and EUCOM were false": the Counter Intelligence Corps employed and paid Barbie, and knew where he was, from April 1947 until he left for [South America](/places/south-america/) in March 1951. Ryan found Lightner's language not inconsistent with the conclusion that no one at HICOG knew Barbie was still in CIC custody, and recorded that "[n]either Lightner nor McCloy recalled the Barbie matter when questioned in this investigation."[^20] ### The Ford Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations and the CIA McCloy was brought into the Ford Foundation as a consultant by Henry Ford II and insisted that it add a full European program, directed by his former HICOG public affairs director, Shepard Stone. In a letter of December 31, 1951, as he prepared to leave Germany, McCloy urged Paul G. Hoffman that the Foundation "help to carry on certain operations which the future [US] Embassy may find difficult to continue, but which are of great significance to United States objectives in Germany."[^21] The Amherst finding aid describes his tenure as chairman of the Foundation's board of trustees as running from 1952 to 1965; his Ford papers include a report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Grenville Clark's 1954 proposal for a Foundation-supported program on disarmament.[^22] On April 29, 1953, McCloy, on Council on Foreign Relations letterhead, wrote Allen Dulles, by then Director of Central Intelligence, that he was "delighted to have a report from Shep Stone" that Dulles would join a Council study group on relations between the democratic nations and the [Soviet Union](/places/soviet-union/), "undertaken at the Council on Foreign Relations under a grant of the Ford Foundation," with a full-time staff under Henry L. Roberts of Columbia University. "Though the group will be entirely unofficial, its findings will be made available to our government," he wrote, adding that the CIA's Robert Amory would attend the first dinner meeting on May 6, 1953.[^23] In a letter of February 25, 1954, quoted by the historian Volker Berghahn and cited by Harm Langenkamp, Stone wrote McCloy about the Congress for Cultural Freedom: "you know the sources of funds that have hitherto been supplied to the Congress, but in our conversation with these gentlemen [Nabokov and Rougemont] we should not reveal what we know."[^24] A memorandum of May 21, 1954 by Don K. Price set the Foundation's policy on government-sponsored programs: such projects could be recommended if "worth support on their merits, regardless of any official interest," and with the prior approval of three trustees, "the Chairman, the President, and 'Mr. McCloy.'" Langenkamp, citing Price's 1972 oral history and McCloy's interview with Kai Bird, writes that McCloy and Price later defended the arrangement as a means of limiting the [Central Intelligence Agency](/organizations/central-intelligence-agency/)'s access to Foundation officers and grantees, quotes McCloy as saying the Foundation could not keep its "shirts clean" had it closed the door on the Agency entirely, and quotes Price's warning to Dulles and [Frank Wisner](/people/frank-wisner/): "The first time you meddle with our boys, we'll quit this whole program." In 1958 Dulles invited Foundation officers to Washington for a briefing on Agency operations, and in 1959 Price reached an understanding allowing the CIA to approach Foundation fellows after their grants expired; in the early 1960s Foundation president Henry T. Heald repeated the Foundation's position to Director [John McCone](/people/john-mccone/).[^24] Writing of 1962, when Stone sought a five-year guarantee of some $2,000,000 a year to free the Congress for Cultural Freedom from the CIA's treasury, Langenkamp describes McCloy as Stone's "staunchest ally" and as having by then assumed the chairmanship of the board. The Congress, which the CIA had tried from the outset to transfer to the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, reached self-sufficiency through Ford's 1957 to 1962 grant at the moment the cover of the Agency's network of front organizations was blown; Stone's 1962 proposal itself foundered.[^25] McCloy was chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1953 to 1971.[^1] ### Chase Manhattan McCloy was chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank from January 1953 to December 1960; the bank merged with the Bank of the Manhattan Company in April 1955 to form the Chase Manhattan Bank.[^1] His papers include six volumes of appointment and telephone logs kept as chairman from 1953 to 1958, consisting mostly of names with almost no notation of subject matter, and correspondence of March 1960 concerning his retirement from the bank.[^26] On April 20, 1962, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Marshall S. Carter wrote him at One Chase Manhattan Plaza that he was being briefed that afternoon on "the other matter" they had discussed by telephone and would come back with "a substantive proposal."[^27] ### Counsel to the Oil Companies From 1961 McCloy was a name partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hope, Hadley & McCloy.[^1] For much of the 1960s and 1970s he advised the "McCloy Group," representatives of most of the major American oil companies and several European and British firms, on legal questions and on foreign and domestic policy, and advocated on their behalf in the Justice Department, the State Department and Congress. His files on the group include representation agreements dated March 20 to August 2, 1962. He kept the Antitrust Division informed of oil group meetings and negotiations, sought specific clearance for actions that might have been construed as violations of the antitrust laws, and "made a point of holding briefing meetings with each new Attorney General to ensure a continuity of contact and goodwill with the Department."[^28] From the early 1960s McCloy represented the Seven Sisters (Gulf, Shell, BP, Exxon, Socal, Texaco and Mobil) and was engaged by other companies operating in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. He testified to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the [Senate Committee on Foreign Relations](/organizations/senate-foreign-relations-committee/), chaired by Senator [Frank Church](/people/frank-church/), that while an adviser to President [John F. Kennedy](/people/john-f-kennedy/) he raised the possibility of joint action by the companies against the combined pressure of the producing countries, and that the President arranged a meeting with Attorney General [Robert F. Kennedy](/people/robert-kennedy/). Asked whether the understanding was ever formalized, he answered: "No, I don't believe I ever got a letter from him in regard to it." He informed Deputy Attorney General Byron White and Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach, Ramsey Clark and [John Mitchell](/people/john-n-mitchell/) of his concerns about OPEC in informal conversations.[^29] On January 11, 1967, as the [Internal Revenue Service](/organizations/internal-revenue-service/) questioned the industry's pricing practices, McCloy wrote Secretary of State [Dean Rusk](/people/dean-rusk/) about an IRS audit of the tax returns of the five American majors: "I believe that the Department of State has a particular responsibility to make known to the Treasury Department the implications of its proposed attack on crude oil prices," because the system of royalties and creditable local income taxes "was recommended to the oil companies and to the foreign governments involved in the Department of State and the Treasury Department," and without it "large amounts of direct foreign aid might well be required." The subcommittee found that the failure of the IRS to reverse its original ruling after posted and realized prices diverged in 1957 "has cost the U.S. Treasury billions of dollars in revenues"; in 1973 Exxon paid an effective rate of 11.2 percent on earnings of $2.98 billion, Mobil 5 percent and Texaco 2.3 percent.[^30] On December 9, 1969, McCloy joined [David Rockefeller](/people/david-rockefeller/) and the men listed as Jamieson, Anderson, Warner and Swearingen in a meeting with President [Richard Nixon](/people/richard-nixon/) and [Henry Kissinger](/people/henry-a-kissinger/) on the [Middle East](/places/middle-east/); Kissinger's briefing memorandum titled it "Your Meeting with the David Rockefeller Group."[^31] ### The Libyan Producers Agreement and the Business Review Letters On September 25, 1970, McCloy attended, as attorney for several of the major companies, a meeting at which Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson told the companies operating in [Libya](/places/libya/) that United States intervention with the Libyan government would be "ineffective at best."[^32] On September 29, 1970, Peter Flanigan, the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs, recorded that McCloy, "representative of the International Oil Company," had spoken with Johnson; that Flanigan had cleared with Attorney General Mitchell that the companies could discuss a Libyan proposal together "if they were to sit down together with a member of the Justice Department"; and that "[t]his information was given to John McCloy who also spoke to Mitchell." Flanigan suggested to McCloy that the penalties of a break with Libya were greater than those of a settlement, reasoning that a settlement's cost increase would fall on all European and Japanese supplies but only a small part of American supplies, so that "the result would be a competitive benefit to the United States"; he told McCloy the government would expect the companies "to follow the course that they and he thought best."[^33] On January 7, 1971, Johnson met representatives of Esso, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco and Socal and "attorney John McCloy" on OPEC's demands; McCloy said the producers' cartel was in "very strong bargaining position" and asked whether the State Department "could be helpful with Department of Justice in obtaining permission under anti-trust laws for companies to coordinate response."[^34] James Akins of the State Department and Dudley Chapman of the Antitrust Division were detailed to work with the companies and McCloy on the documents.[^29] The Antitrust Division under Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren issued Business Review letters to McCloy covering a joint "Message to OPEC" and the Libyan Producers Agreement (the Safety Net Agreement), under which Libyan producers would replace the production of any company shut in for resisting Libyan demands, with Persian Gulf production to be shared under specified circumstances. The letters stated that the Department "does not presently intend to institute any proceedings under the antitrust laws." The subcommittee's report dates the letters January 19, 1971, and in the next paragraph places a January 15 meeting of McCloy and the chief executives with Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Under Secretary John N. Irwin II "two days after the issuance of the Business Review letters." At that meeting the companies sought a high-level mission to the producing countries; asked by Church whether he had suggested Irwin, McCloy answered: "No. As long as it was a person of dignity, with clout, to use that expression." Irwin, sent with Nixon's authorization, recommended from [Tehran](/places/tehran/) that the companies negotiate with the Gulf states separately; Rogers communicated the recommendation to McCloy, who informed the chief executives, and the subcommittee found that the State Department had thereby abandoned the strategy of a single global negotiation that lay at the heart of the Message to OPEC and the Business Review letters.[^34] [^35] The companies formed a London Policy Group, with a parallel group in New York. Each London Policy Group meeting, on dates from January 20 to June 18, 1971, "was attended by a partner or associate from the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, counsel for the oil companies, whose function was to assure that the discussions remained within the terms of the Message to OPEC, the Libyan Producers Agreement, and the pertinent business review letters from the Antitrust Division." "No member of the Departments of Justice or State attended any of these meetings; instead, both Departments relied upon ex post-factor [sic] oral reports by oil company executives to Akins and written reports from McCloy to McLaren."[^35] The subcommittee found "no evidence of any Department of Justice monitoring of the negotiations"; not until October 1973, after subcommittee staff began to inquire, did anyone at the Department read the cable record of the company-OPEC negotiations.[^36] The February 14, 1971 Tehran Agreement raised the Gulf governments' take by an estimated $11.7 billion over five years, a cost McCloy described to McLaren as "extremely high."[^35] On October 15, 1971, McCloy informed McLaren that Libya had taken unilateral steps on exchange rates, and on October 19 he asked for further Business Review letters covering joint negotiation on currency parity and participation and an extension of the sharing agreement; the Department issued new letters addressed to him.[^37] At a State Department meeting on January 3, 1972 attended by the chairmen of the major companies, [Nelson Bunker Hunt](/people/nelson-bunker-hunt/) and McCloy, the Under Secretary of State proposed an industry advisory body; on January 20 McCloy and Akins agreed that an informal body was acceptable, and McCloy reported that some executives were "disturbed" by Akins's insistence that the companies change their relationship with the producing countries by 1976.[^38] The Business Review letters required the companies to report to the Justice Department through McCloy. In March 1973 a suit by the Corporate Accountability Research Group for the documents was pending against the Justice Department, "[a] similar request by [The New York Times](/organizations/new-york-times/) in 1971 had been averted under the [Freedom of Information Act](/events/freedom-of-information-act/)," and the companies told State Department officials that the sharing agreement was a "form of insurance" that had allowed Bunker Hunt Oil Company to "stand firm" against Libyan demands. On March 23, 1973, Warren Clark of the North African Office in the Bureau of African Affairs wrote that release would show Libya that the companies had banded together to "denationalize" part of British Petroleum, and that the matter was "very sensitive from a domestic political point of view. The State Department and the USG have sanctioned in these Business Review Letters a strengthening of the international cartel of seven Anglo-Saxon oil companies." A Senate subcommittee "would fry the State Department if it was revealed that we classified these documents in order to protect the 'cartel,' and that we had taken the position that what was good for the cartel was good for US national security." Clark approved keeping the agreement and the letters classified on the narrow ground of proprietary interest.[^39] ### Oil Diplomacy in 1973 and 1974 [William J. Casey](/people/william-j-casey/) sat on McCloy's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament; the committee's letterheads of June 1970 and March and May 1971 list him among the members.[^40] On September 5, 1973, McCloy met Casey, by then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and asked that the government send a strong note on the illegality of Libya's nationalization, work with the Europeans "to make the Libyan expropriation attempt fail" by obtaining agreement not to buy oil from fields operated by the majors, and lift the environmental sulphur restriction as a demonstration of political determination. John Knubel of the [National Security Council](/organizations/national-security-council/) staff recorded for Kissinger McCloy's estimate that the net shortfall to the United States would be "about 50,000 barrels per day" if the majors stopped pumping Libyan oil, "a manageable amount (according to McCloy)".[^41] On October 12, 1973, during the October War, McCloy sent Alexander Haig a memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, stating that the "chief ARAMCO shareholders" wished it "placed in the President's hands as soon as possible"; the memorandum warned that OPEC's demands could raise the free world's oil cost from the Persian Gulf alone by $15 billion a year, and a notation on Kissinger's covering memorandum of November 3 indicates that Nixon saw it.[^42] On November 20, 1973, Kissinger met ten oil industry executives and McCloy, listed as "Milbank and Tweed," with Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Thomas Kauper among the officials present; Kissinger told McCloy he wanted to meet him "and a group of Atlanticists" about the Europeans, and the next day [Brent Scowcroft](/people/brent-scowcroft/) reported that McCloy was prepared to assemble Americans and Europeans for the purpose. On February 8, 1974, Kissinger telephoned McCloy that "[w]e cannot have the Community organized against us as anti-American."[^43] Opening a meeting with the oil company heads on March 29, 1974, Kissinger said he had called it "after talking with Jack McCloy," and that "[t]he transcript taken here isn't going to go anywhere, except into my own personal files." When Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements described the encouragement of technology and industry transfers into [Saudi Arabia](/places/saudi-arabia/) and the Atlantic Richfield chairman, Robert O. Anderson, added, "In exchange for which we get a preferential position," McCloy said: "In other words, pick up the Yamani offer."[^44] In a letter of September 21, 1973 to Kauper, McCloy listed his clients and reported that the producing states were again demanding changes to the Tehran and Tripoli agreements. In a later letter to Church he stated that American companies in the Middle East had made an affirmative contribution of over $2 billion to the 1972 balance of payments; the subcommittee found that the Commerce Department estimates on which he relied had "recently been found to be substantially in error" because they were computed on posted rather than realized prices.[^45] The McCloy Group appears to have been inactive from June 1973 to February 1979.[^28] ### The Critchfield Reports and the Oil Files The International Oil series of his papers contains sub-series I, "Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973," consisting of 49 "perspectives on development" and 16 special reports on Middle East issues. The Amherst archivists state that "[m]ost, if not all," were prepared by Basic Resources International, a Falls Church, Virginia, consulting firm "headed by [James H. Critchfield](/people/james-h-critchfield/), formerly CIA bureau chief for the Middle East," and that Report 60 is a prospectus for the firm. Sub-series K of the same series holds a folder titled "Chase Manhattan Bank. Financial analysis of thirty-one petroleum companies" among oil company reports for 1964 to 1966. Other folders in the series hold a draft legal brief on taxes on oil company income and drafts of a proposed letter from President Nixon to the Shah of Iran.[^46] ### Brazil and the McCone File On February 21, 1964, Ambassador [Lincoln Gordon](/people/lincoln-gordon/) reported from Rio de Janeiro that President [João Goulart](/people/joao-goulart/) "said looking forward to McCloy visit and thought Hanna case could have constructive solution." On February 29, 1964, McCloy, then a partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, met Goulart in Rio to discuss the status of the M.A. Hanna Mining Company.[^47] On April 9, 1964, at 11:10 a.m., Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and McCloy spoke by telephone; four pages of the source text of the transcript, filed in McCone's "Eyes Only" telephone records, have not been declassified. The same day the three military ministers, Artur Costa e Silva, Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo and Augusto Hamann Rademaker Grünewald, signed Brazil's Institutional Act.[^48] On June 10, 1964, President [Humberto Castelo Branco](/people/humberto-castelo-branco/) showed Gordon a staff report on "areas of friction abroad," including the Hanna case, and said work on resolving all of them was going forward rapidly.[^49] ### The Warren Commission [Lyndon B. Johnson](/people/lyndon-b-johnson/) created the Commission by Executive Order 11130 of November 29, 1963, and selected from private life two lawyers, Allen Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence, and McCloy; Chief Justice Earl Warren, Senators Richard B. Russell and John Sherman Cooper, and Representatives Hale Boggs and [Gerald R. Ford](/people/gerald-r-ford/) completed its membership. Its first meeting was on December 5, 1963.[^50] A transcript titled "Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," dated July 9, 1964, records a meeting attended by General Counsel J. Lee Rankin, staff, McCloy and Dulles, at which Drs. Dale C. Cameron, Howard P. Rome and David A. Rothstein gave "an informal colloquy, interrogation, and explanation" on a psychiatric interpretation of [Lee Harvey Oswald](/people/lee-harvey-oswald/); its pages, 7821 to 8071, indicate that it was volume 57 of the Commission's transcripts.[^51] Rankin's files, donated to the JFK Collection, include memoranda and handwritten changes to draft chapters of the report that Ford, McCloy and Dulles, among others, recommended.[^52] Among the papers of Director McCone, the [Assassination Records Review Board](/organizations/assassination-records-review-board/) found a notation for a meeting of May 19, 1964, participants "DCI, J.J. McCloy," a dinner at the Director's residence, "Re: Oswald," annotated "Destroyed 1-28-72"; CIA historians had found the document missing when they reviewed the files in 1986, along with a record of a November 26, 1963 meeting between McCone and [McGeorge Bundy](/people/mcgeorge-bundy/) on the assassination. The Board designated the notations as assassination records.[^53] ### Disarmament and the Cuban Missile Crisis On January 27, 1961, Kennedy designated McCloy his adviser on disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test ban, with offices in the [White House](/places/white-house/) and the State Department. On February 7, 1961, Dulles answered a McCloy letter on the test ban by naming Herbert Scoville, the CIA's Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, as the Agency's point of contact.[^54] In July 1961 McCloy and Valerian Zorin conducted bilateral disarmament talks in Moscow; McCloy reported "little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles."[^55] McCloy chaired the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament from 1961 to 1974, and the committee's sessions drew briefings from CIA officers including Arthur Lundahl of the National Photographic Interpretation Center and [David Brandwein](/people/david-brandwein/), chairman of the Guided Missile Committee; in November 1969 he asked Director [Richard Helms](/people/richard-helms/) for a CIA specialist on Chinese strategic questions, noting that the content of the committee's discussions "is classified and should not be revealed beyond the Committee."[^40] In the [Cuban Missile Crisis](/events/cuban-missile-crisis/) McCloy chaired the Coordinating Committee and negotiated with the Soviet representative Vasily Kuznetsov in New York. On October 26, 1962, he joined Adlai Stevenson in talks with the [United Nations](/organizations/united-nations/) Secretary-General and his aides on inspection and the removal of the missiles and IL-28 aircraft. A draft United States declaration headed "McCloy draft" and dated November 21, 1962 conditioned an assurance against invading Cuba on the withdrawal of offensive weapons. On January 2 and 3, 1963, McCloy and Kuznetsov negotiated the joint letter withdrawing the matter from the Security Council.[^56] ### Iran From 1979 to 1981 McCloy was a member of a "Special Project Team" working to gain asylum in the United States for the deposed [Shah of Iran](/people/mohammad-reza-pahlavi/); the team was headed by David Rockefeller, then chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and included Kissinger and Chase vice president Joseph Verner Reed Jr. The team lobbied the President and the Secretary of State for the Shah's admission; he was admitted in October 1979 for cancer treatment, which was followed by the November 1979 seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran. Rockefeller in particular "was accused of helping the Shah out of self-interest, because of the millions of dollars of Iranian loans and assets held by the Chase Manhattan Bank."[^57] ### The Papers McCloy gave his papers to Amherst College, where he was a trustee from 1947 to 1989, by a deed of gift in July 1985. Before their transfer, "roughly half of the papers underwent a national security review by the Department of State"; the bulk arrived in May 1986, "with several batches sent later following clearance by the relevant government agency," and a second installment received in June 1990, after his death, was reviewed by the State Department and legal counsel. The collection holds only photocopies of his War Department diaries; the originals are at the National Archives and Records Administration. Names or other details were removed from some entries to protect the privacy of individuals, and "there are a few places where information was removed from the original by an unknown party prior to the diaries' transfer to Amherst College."[^58] [^1]: Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, "John J. McCloy (AC 1916) Papers, 1897-1989 (Bulk: 1940-1979)," Finding Aid MA.00035, Historical Note and Chronology. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^2]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 7: Black Tom, 1924-1946, scope note and sub-series C to E. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^3]: Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, *Personal Justice Denied* (Washington, D.C., December 1982), Part I, Chapter 2, "Executive Order 9066." https://npshistory.com/publications/incarceration/personal-justice-denied/chap2.htm [^4]: *Personal Justice Denied*, Part I, Chapter 3, "Exclusion and Evacuation." https://npshistory.com/publications/incarceration/personal-justice-denied/chap3.htm [^5]: *Personal Justice Denied*, Part I, Chapter 8, "Ending the Exclusion." https://npshistory.com/publications/incarceration/personal-justice-denied/chap8.htm [^6]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 11: Japanese Americans: Relocation and Compensation, 1942-1989, scope note, sub-series A to F. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^7]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 15: Jenner-McCarthy, 1952-1955, sub-series A to C. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^8]: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "The United States and the Holocaust: Why Auschwitz Was Not Bombed," *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, last edited May 1, 2016. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-united-states-and-the-holocaust-why-auschwitz-was-not-bombed [^9]: John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to John W. Pehle, Executive Director, War Refugee Board, November 18, 1944, as reproduced by the Jewish Virtual Library. https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mccloy-informs-pehle-that-war-department-won-rsquo-t-bomb-auschwitz-november-1944 [^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, index card, "Memoranda for [withheld], Patterson-McCloy, 27, 26 Sept 45," TSD/H 119, dated 12/21/65, CIA-RDP83-00036R000200110010-5 (approved for release 2006/10/17). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000200110010-5 [^11]: World Bank Group Archives, "John J. McCloy, 2nd World Bank President, March 17, 1947 - June 30, 1949." https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/john-jay-mccloy [^12]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 10: World Bank (folder "JJM resignation (to go to HICOG)," 1949 May 18) and Series 2, sub-series B (account of the April 30, 1949 meeting with President Truman). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^13]: Allan A. Ryan Jr., *Klaus Barbie and the United States Government: A Report to the Attorney General of the United States* (U.S. Department of Justice, August 1983), p. 84, note. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-hrsp/legacy/2011/02/04/08-02-83barbie-rpt.pdf [^14]: R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, to John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, August 18, 1949, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300150013-2 (approved for release 2003/06/16). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r001300150013-2 [^15]: Walter B. Smith to John J. McCloy, January 12, 1951, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300110003-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r001300110003-7 ; Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director, to John J. McCloy, June 19, 1951, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300110002-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r001300110002-8 [^16]: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Public Relations Division, *Landsberg: A Documentary Report* (Frankfurt, January 31, 1951), "Statement of US High Commissioner," pp. 2 to 4, and report of the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals. https://archive.org/details/landsbergdocumen00unit [^17]: *Landsberg: A Documentary Report*, "Case 10, The Krupp Case," pp. 9 to 11. https://archive.org/details/landsbergdocumen00unit [^18]: *Landsberg: A Documentary Report*, note preceding "Case 7, The Hostages Case," and "Case 11, Ministries Case." https://archive.org/details/landsbergdocumen00unit [^19]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. VII, part 1, *Germany and Austria*, Document 30 (telegram from the High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State, Bonn, May 9, 1952). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1952-54v07p1/ebook/frus1952-54v07p1.epub [^20]: Ryan, *Klaus Barbie and the United States Government*, pp. 101 (note), 118 to 121 and notes. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-hrsp/legacy/2011/02/04/08-02-83barbie-rpt.pdf [^21]: Harm Langenkamp, "'A Most Interesting and Complex Involvement': Cold War Alignments between the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the Central Intelligence Agency," Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), p. 11 and note 49 (citing McCloy to Hoffman, December 31, 1951, in Kai Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 358). https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf [^22]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 16: Ford Foundation, scope note and sub-series A and B. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^23]: John J. McCloy, Council on Foreign Relations, to Allen W. Dulles, April 29, 1953, CIA-RDP80R01731R001200020045-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r001200020045-2 [^24]: Langenkamp, Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), notes 50 (Stone to McCloy, February 25, 1954, cited by Volker Berghahn), 56 (Price memorandum of May 21, 1954; Price oral history, June 22, 1972, p. 70; McCloy interview in Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 427) and 57 (John B. Howard oral history; Henry T. Heald oral history). https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf [^25]: Langenkamp, Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), abstract, text at notes 58 and 59, and conclusion. https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf [^26]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 2, sub-series F and G (Chase Manhattan Bank appointment records and telephone logs) and Series 1 (retirement from Chase Manhattan, 1960 Mar). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^27]: Marshall S. Carter, Lieutenant General, USA, to John J. McCloy, April 20, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300050094-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001300050094-2 [^28]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, 1946-1981, scope note and sub-series B, C and E. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^29]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, report together with individual views, 93d Cong., 2d sess., committee print, January 2, 1975, pp. 126 to 127. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^30]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 13 and 92 to 93 (McCloy to Rusk, January 11, 1967, Multinational Corporations hearings, Part 9). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, *Energy Crisis, 1969-1974*, Document 21, note 6, and Document 24 (Kissinger to Nixon, December 8, 1969) and note 5. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^32]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 125. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 57 (memorandum for the files by Peter Flanigan, September 29, 1970), pp. 130 to 131. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^34]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 66 (telegram 3565 from the Department of State, January 8, 1971), pp. 167 to 168; *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 127 to 129. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf ; https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^35]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 129 to 133. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^36]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 17. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^37]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 134 to 135. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 104 (memorandum of conversation, Washington, January 3, 1972) and note 2, pp. 246 to 247. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^39]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 173 (editorial note), pp. 438 to 440. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^40]: General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament letterheads and correspondence: McCloy to Arthur Lundahl, June 5, 1970, CIA-RDP78B05703A000400090083-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp78b05703a000400090083-2 ; McCloy to David S. Brandwein, March 26, 1971, CIA-RDP81R00560R000100110004-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81r00560r000100110004-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, May 28, 1971, CIA-RDP74B00681R000100160009-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp74b00681r000100160009-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, November 10, 1969, CIA-RDP80B01495R000100010004-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000100010004-9 [^41]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 201 (memorandum from John Knubel to Kissinger, September 5, 1973), pp. 548 to 549. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^42]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 212 (memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, New York, October 12, 1973) and note 1. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^43]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 243 (memorandum of conversation, November 20, 1973, 5 p.m.) and note 8, pp. 684 to 690; Document 311 (Kissinger and David Rockefeller, February 8, 1974), note 3. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^44]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 345 (memorandum of conversation, March 29, 1974, 5:15 p.m.), pp. 954 to 977. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf [^45]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 14, 127 and 169. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O [^46]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, sub-series B, I (Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973, Reports 1 to 65) and K (Oil Company Annual Reports, 1964-1966). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^47]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, *South and Central America; Mexico*, Document 183 (telegram 1761 from the Embassy in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, February 21, 1964), paragraph 8 and note 10, pp. 402 to 403. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf [^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 210 (transcript of telephone conversation between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and John J. McCloy, April 9, 1964, 11:10 a.m.; source: CIA, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Telephone Calls, Eyes Only), p. 461, and Document 211 (telegram 2235 from Rio de Janeiro, April 10, 1964), note 2. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf [^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 214 (telegram 2790 from Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1964). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf [^50]: *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, Foreword, p. ix, National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/foreword [^51]: National Archives, "Inventory of the Warren Commission's Records," Entry 46 ("Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," July 9, 1964, National Archives Identifier 607521). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/inventory [^52]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt [^53]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "John McCone." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt [^54]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, *Arms Control and Disarmament*, Document 2 (Kennedy to McCloy, January 27, 1961) and note 1, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub ; Allen W. Dulles to John J. McCloy, February 7, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050039-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r000800050039-9 [^55]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, Document 41 (editorial note). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub [^56]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath*, Documents 86 (telegram 1484 from the Mission to the United Nations, October 26, 1962) and 263 (editorial note), https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v11/ebook/frus1961-63v11.epub ; "McCloy Draft," 11/21/62, CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100035-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001900100035-5 [^57]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 28: Shah of Iran, 1979-1981, scope note. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf [^58]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, "History of the Collection," "Processing Information" and Series 2: Diaries and Communication Logs, notes. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf