---
category: BCCI Scandal
created: 2026-09-23
relations:
- fn: 1
  role: senior officer
  type: employed_by
  with: '[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]'
- fn: 1
  type: reported_to
  with: '[[Agha Hasan Abedi]]'
- fn: 1
  role: worked with Lance on the Financial General takeover, 1977-78
  type: partner_of
  with: '[[Bert Lance]]'
summary: Senior BCCI officer from the bank's founding whose January 1978 memo to Abedi
  set out the nominee scheme for taking over Financial General Bankshares and recorded
  Clark Clifford's blessing.
tags:
- Person
- BCCI
- FirstAmerican
- FinancialGeneral
- 1970s
updated: 2026-09-23
---

Abdus Sami was, in the words of a [Federal Reserve](/organizations/federal-reserve-board/) finding quoted by the [Kerry-Brown Senate Report](/events/bcci-kerry-brown-senate-report/), "a senior BCCI officer from its inception and a close associate of [Abedi](/people/agha-hasan-abedi/)." In late 1977 and early 1978 he worked with [Bert Lance](/people/bert-lance/) on the secret acquisition of [Financial General Bankshares](/organizations/financial-general-bankshares/), later [First American](/organizations/first-american-bank/), by the [Bank of Credit and Commerce International](/organizations/bank-of-credit-and-commerce-international/) (BCCI), and his telex to Abedi of January 30, 1978, known as the Sami memo, became the report's principal documentary evidence of the scheme.[^1][^2]

### Stephens and Lance

According to the Federal Reserve, Sami met [Jackson Stephens](/people/jackson-stephens/) at Lance's suggestion to discuss the purchase by a BCCI client of the interest of Lance and others in the [National Bank of Georgia](/organizations/national-bank-of-georgia/); during the meeting on November 7, 1977, Stephens, "who was dissatisfied with his investment in Financial General, told Sami that Financial General might be a good investment for BCCI clients." The Senate report called these findings "the only account that is consistent with the contemporaneous documentary records," and said they showed that Lance's testimony had omitted Stephens' role and that [Robert Altman](/people/robert-altman/)'s account had omitted those of Lance and BCCI.[^1] Lance testified to a later meeting at which Abedi, [Swaleh Naqvi](/people/swaleh-naqvi/), Sami and Dildar Rizvi, "the elite of BCCI," discussed the purchase of the Georgia bank and of Financial General; [Ghaith Pharaon](/people/ghaith-r-pharaon/), the nominal purchaser of the Georgia bank, was not present.[^3]

### The Sami Memo

The memo, written in [Washington](/places/washington-dc/) and sent to Abedi in [Karachi](/places/karachi/), was later found by the Federal Reserve in BCCI's files in [Abu Dhabi](/places/abu-dhabi/), having previously been held in Karachi. It reported that the BCCI group had bought 17.5 percent of Financial General's stock and had commitments or control over 23 to 24 percent, and that a meeting was needed between "our friend," Bert Lance, and the Middendorf group to decide whether the takeover would proceed by consent or by contest. Sami advised Abedi to prepare for litigation in which the Middendorf group would argue against a foreign takeover, and to retain [Clark Clifford](/people/clark-clifford/) as counsel. He continued:[^1]

> To keep individual ownership to below 5 percent we have to distribute the ownership to 4 persons of substance. We have already given the names of Sheikh [Kamal Adham](/people/kamal-adham/) and Mr. Fulaig [sic]. We want two other names immediately.

He added that care was needed so that BCCI's "name does not appear as financier to most of them for this acquisition." The Senate report described the memo as setting out "an intentional strategy by BCCI, Lance, Adham, Fulaij, and other members of the BCCI group to disguise BCCI's underlying interest in the transaction" and so circumvent the rule that anyone buying 5 percent of a public company must file a disclosure with the [Securities and Exchange Commission](/organizations/securities-and-exchange-commission/).[^1] Within days BCCI added two further shareholders, Sheikh [Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan](/people/sultan-bin-zayed-al-nahyan/) of Abu Dhabi and Abdullah Darwaish, the financial adviser to the Abu Dhabi ruling family; in the account of the report's chapter on Georgia politicians, the two names submitted were those of Sheikh Zayed's sons Khalifa and Mohammad.[^1][^3]

Sami also told Abedi that he had "met Clark Clifford and explained to him our strategy and our goal. He was happy to know the details and has blessed the acquisition." The Senate report found that this placed Clifford in the scheme by January 1978, before the SEC litigation of mid-February that Clifford had described as the start of his involvement, and that his law firm's bill of May 24, 1978, dated its services to BCCI from January.[^1][^2] Asked by Senator [John Kerry](/people/john-kerry/) about the memo, Lance acknowledged that "our friend" referred to him, but testified that "the acquisition of shares were basically handled by Mr. Sami, and he was the man who was responsible. I was not involved in that."[^3]

[^1]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 6, "BCCI in the United States: Initial Entry" (quoting the Sami memo from S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 3). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/06early.htm
[^2]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 13, "Clark Clifford and Robert Altman" (citing the Sami memo to Abedi, January 30, 1978, S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 3, pp. 26-27). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/13clifford.htm
[^3]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 16, "BCCI and Georgia Politicians." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/16ga.htm
