---
alias:
- Gulf War
- Persian Gulf War
- 1991 Gulf War
- First Gulf War
- Operation Desert Storm
- Operation Desert Shield
- Gulf War of 1991
- Desert Storm
- Desert Shield
- Persian Gulf Conflict
category: Major Conflict
created: 2026-10-01
end: 1991-02-28
location: Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
relations:
- end: 1991-02-28
  fn: 1
  reverse: true
  role: president of Iraq whose forces invaded Kuwait
  start: 1990-08-02
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Saddam Hussein]]'
- end: 1991-02-28
  fn: 6
  reverse: true
  role: President of the United States; American troop commitment of more than 500,000
  start: 1990-08-02
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[George H.W. Bush]]'
- end: 1990-07-25
  fn: 16
  reverse: true
  role: United States ambassador to Iraq; meeting with Saddam Hussein
  start: 1990-07-25
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[April Glaspie]]'
- end: 1990-07-25
  fn: 16
  reverse: true
  role: Iraqi foreign minister present at the meeting with Glaspie
  start: 1990-07-25
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Tariq Aziz]]'
- fn: 28
  reverse: true
  role: public relations firm of Citizens for a Free Kuwait
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Hill and Knowlton]]'
- fn: 28
  reverse: true
  role: Kuwaiti-funded publicity organization
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Citizens for a Free Kuwait]]'
- fn: 35
  reverse: true
  role: Hill & Knowlton Washington office, Kuwait account
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Lauri Fitz-Pegado]]'
- end: 1990-10-10
  fn: 29
  reverse: true
  role: co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus hearing at which Nayirah
    testified
  start: 1990-10-10
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Tom Lantos]]'
- end: 1990-10-10
  fn: 29
  reverse: true
  role: co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus hearing at which Nayirah
    testified
  start: 1990-10-10
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[John Edward Porter]]'
- end: 1991
  fn: 39
  reverse: true
  role: contributed 16,854 million dollars in cash and in kind toward American incremental
    costs
  start: 1990
  type: funded
  with: '[[Saudi Arabia]]'
- end: 1991
  fn: 39
  reverse: true
  role: contributed 16,059 million dollars toward American incremental costs
  start: 1990
  type: funded
  with: '[[Kuwait]]'
- end: 1991
  fn: 39
  reverse: true
  role: contributed 10,012 million dollars toward American incremental costs
  start: 1990
  type: funded
  with: '[[Japan]]'
- end: 1991
  fn: 39
  reverse: true
  role: contributed 6,455 million dollars toward American incremental costs
  start: 1990
  type: funded
  with: '[[Germany]]'
- end: 1991
  fn: 39
  reverse: true
  role: contributed 3,870 million dollars in cash and 218 million in kind toward American
    incremental costs
  start: 1990
  type: funded
  with: '[[United Arab Emirates]]'
- end: 1994-10-07
  fn: 44
  reverse: true
  role: chaired by Donald Riegle; hearing of May 25, 1994 on dual-use exports and
    veterans' illnesses
  start: 1993-08
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Senate Banking Committee]]'
- fn: 45
  reverse: true
  role: final report of December 1996 on veterans' illnesses and Khamisiyah
  start: 1995-05
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'' Illnesses]]'
- fn: 46
  reverse: true
  role: report of November 2008 on Gulf War illness
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'' Illnesses]]'
- end: 1994-02-10
  fn: 35
  reverse: true
  role: nomination hearing at which the Kuwaiti publicity campaign was examined
  start: 1994-02-10
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation]]'
start: 1990-08-02
summary: The 1990 to 1991 war in which a United States-led coalition expelled Iraq
  from Kuwait, after years of credits and exports to Baghdad, with Kuwaiti-paid publicity
  beforehand and veterans' illnesses afterward.
tags:
- Event
- GulfWar
- Iraq
- Kuwait
- DesertStorm
- CommodityCreditCorporation
- BNLScandal
- HillAndKnowlton
- CitizensForAFreeKuwait
- Nayirah
- GulfWarIllness
- Khamisiyah
- DualUseExports
- Section401
updated: 2026-10-01
---

The Gulf War followed the invasion of [Kuwait](/places/kuwait/) by [Iraq](/places/iraq/) on August 2, 1990, when three divisions of the Republican Guard Forces Command crossed the Kuwaiti frontier at 0100 local time and a special operations force attacked Kuwait City by helicopter at 0130.[^1] The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 the same day.[^2] On November 29, 1990 it adopted Resolution 678, which authorized member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti government, if Iraq had not complied by January 15, 1991, "to use all necessary means" to uphold Resolution 660 and the later resolutions.[^3] Coalition air attacks began on January 17, 1991, the ground offensive on February 24, and offensive operations ended at 0800 on February 28.[^4] The [Department of Defense](/organizations/department-of-defense/) counted 613 American battle casualties, among them 146 killed in action (35 by fire from friendly forces) and 467 wounded (72 by friendly fire).[^5] More than 500,000 American troops took part, with more than 200,000 troops from other countries.[^2][^6]

### Iraqi Debts and the Border Dispute

[Saddam Hussein](/people/saddam-hussein/)'s government financed its war with [Iran](/places/iran/) largely through loans; its Arab neighbors had lent it more than 37 billion dollars, and its 1990 military budget was 12.9 billion dollars. On July 17, 1990 Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the [United Arab Emirates](/places/united-arab-emirates/) of exceeding oil production quotas. A meeting arranged by Hosni Mubarak and King Fahd at Jiddah on August 1 ended when the Iraqi representative, Izzat Ibrahim, walked out, citing Kuwaiti reluctance to discuss the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan or to forgive Iraq's debt. Kuwaiti forces had gone on full alert after the July 17 speech and reduced the alert to 25 percent a week later.[^1]

### American Credits and Exports before the Invasion

In 1988 the United States Senate passed chemical warfare legislation aimed at Iraq. Iraq cancelled consultations on its fiscal 1989 agricultural credit guarantees, and the sanctions were removed from the bill, which passed in late December 1988, "because of agricultural and foreign policy considerations."[^7] In 1990 bills to restrict assistance to Iraq were introduced in both houses: S. 2480, which would have barred credits and guarantees unless the President certified that Iraq had opened its nuclear, chemical and biological sites to inspection; H.R. 4585, which passed the House but not the Senate; and H.R. 4918, S. 2779 and S. 2787, none of which passed. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration opposed congressionally imposed sanctions for four reasons, among them that other nations would not join an embargo and that the administration's policy was to avoid using agricultural trade to pursue foreign policy goals. The Foreign Agricultural Service's revised risk procedure recommended limiting fiscal 1991 guarantees to 200 million dollars, conditioned on resolution of the BNL investigation.[^7]

The [guarantees](/programs/commodity-credit-corporation-iraq-program/) came from the [Commodity Credit Corporation](/organizations/commodity-credit-corporation/) of the Department of Agriculture. They had begun in fiscal 1983 at 401.9 million dollars, reached a high of about 1.1 billion dollars in each of fiscal 1988 and 1989, and totaled about 4.5 billion dollars through fiscal 1989, with 500 million dollars more approved for fiscal 1990. The department's own risk analyses for fiscal 1989 and 1990 rated Iraq a high-risk market. The General Accounting Office wrote that "it also appears that foreign policy played at least as large a role in determining Iraq's GSM program levels as did market development potential, according to conversations we had with FAS and State Department officials."[^8][^9]

National Security Directive 26, issued by President [George H.W. Bush](/people/george-hw-bush/) and dated October 2, 1989, stated that "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East," that the government "should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq," and that any illegal use of chemical or biological weapons "will lead to economic and political sanctions." It also stated that the government "should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation and other significant objectives," and that, "as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment," it should consider sales of non-lethal military assistance case by case. The directive instructed the [Director of Central Intelligence](/organizations/director-of-central-intelligence/) to increase collection on early warning indicators in the Gulf.[^10]

Loans from the [Atlanta](/places/atlanta/) branch of [Banca Nazionale del Lavoro](/organizations/banca-nazionale-del-lavoro/) were among those guaranteed. The Northern District of Georgia United States Attorney's office was notified in August 1989 that the branch had kept a second set of books and made unauthorized and unreported loans to Iraq, and the Agriculture Department's inspector general joined the investigation in September 1989, when it learned that about 750 million dollars of the loans were guaranteed by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Agriculture offered half of the 1 billion dollars Iraq requested for fiscal 1990, "with the remainder dependent on the results of the ongoing Justice investigation." The first 500 million dollars was exhausted, and Iraq asked for more in February 1990.[^8] The General Accounting Office concluded that "the U.S. desire to build a strategic and agricultural trade relationship with Iraq outweighed the apparent financial risks involved and discounted evidence of Iraq's human rights violations."[^8]

The [Central Intelligence Agency](/organizations/central-intelligence-agency/) Directorate of Intelligence circulated a memorandum on November 6, 1989 titled "Iraq-Italy: Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." It stated that the branch had extended 3.2 billion dollars in 2,500 unauthorized letters of credit between February 1988 and July 1989, disbursing 1.85 billion dollars, including at least 800 million dollars guaranteed by the Commodity Credit Corporation, at an average commission of 0.2 percent. It cited British press reports that Iraq had used at least 600 million dollars of the credits to buy military and dual-use technology through front companies, described a procurement network in which "In 1987 TMG gained control of Matrix-Churchill, Ltd.," and stated: "We believe Iraqi intelligence is directly involved in the activities of many holding companies funnelling technology to Iraq." On the effect on American relations the memorandum said that the strain "will probably be short-lived, particularly if [Baghdad](/places/baghdad/) believes additional US credits will be forthcoming after the dust of the investigation settles."[^11] [Matrix Churchill](/organizations/matrix-churchill/) is the subject of the British prosecution and the [Scott Inquiry](/events/scott-inquiry/) recorded at [Arms-to-Iraq](/events/arms-to-iraq/).

Between the search of the branch on August 4, 1989 and the return of the indictment on February 28, 1991, the day offensive operations ended, the United States Attorney's office, a task force, the Justice Department and the [FBI](/organizations/federal-bureau-of-investigation/) investigated more than 5.5 billion dollars in loans and letters of credit made largely to benefit entities controlled by the Iraqi government.[^12] The branch manager, [Christopher Drogoul](/people/christopher-drogoul/), was the defendant. Joseph D. Whitley became acting United States Attorney on June 1, 1990 and recused himself from the case the same day; his former law firm had at one time represented Matrix-Churchill.[^13] The independent counsel [Frederick Lacey](/people/frederick-lacey/), whose report is printed in the [House Banking Committee](/organizations/house-banking-committee/)'s 1993 hearing record, wrote of [Brent Scowcroft](/people/brent-scowcroft/) and [Lawrence Eagleburger](/people/lawrence-eagleburger/), who had been officers of [Kissinger Associates](/organizations/kissinger-associates/) when Banca Nazionale del Lavoro was its client: "It is clear that, while at Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft and Eagleburger came into contact with BNL management. I have seen nothing, however, to suggest that they knew of BNL-Atlanta's wrongful loans to Iraq or influenced the prosecution of this matter."[^13] In written answers to the committee Drogoul wrote that [Wafai Dajani](/people/wafai-dajani/) had told him that [Henry A. Kissinger](/people/henry-a-kissinger/) "was the architect of these loans as they related to U.S. foreign policy," and: "As to the United States, I concluded that they must have been aware of our activities."[^14] The prosecution and the committee's investigation under [Henry B. Gonzalez](/people/henry-b-gonzalez/) are recorded at [BNL Scandal](/events/bnl-scandal/).

### July 25, 1990

A Central Intelligence Agency combined message titled "Middle East Area Brief for 25 July 1990" carried an item headed "Iraq-Kuwait: Is Baghdad Bluffing." It stated: "KUWAIT BELIEVES IRAQ IS ONLY BLUFFING. THE KUWAITIS PROBABLY ARE MISTAKEN," and, of Iraq: "IRAQ PROBABLY IS NOT BLUFFING; TO ACCEPT LESS THAN SATISFACTION OF ITS DEMANDS FOR REDUCED OIL PRODUCTION AND CASH IN THE FORM OF AN ARAB RECONSTRUCTION FUND WOULD BE A HUMILIATING RETREAT." The brief placed Republican Guard artillery and rocket launchers near the Kuwaiti border and judged that Saddam Hussein "ALMOST CERTAINLY FEARS THAT BROADER MILITARY ACTION WOULD BRING THE US INTO THE FRAY."[^15]

At noon the same day Saddam Hussein received the American ambassador, April Glaspie, with the foreign minister Tariq Aziz, the head of his office, two note-takers and an interpreter present. Her cable to the United States Secretary of State, logged at 12:46 and classified secret, described his manner as "cordial, reasonable and even warm" over two hours. It recorded Saddam Hussein as saying, with the President and Secretary [Baker](/people/james-a-baker-iii/) emphatically excluded, that "some circles" in the American government, including the CIA and the [State Department](/organizations/state-department/), were not friendly toward Iraq, and listing among his evidence that they "worked to ensure no help would go to Iraq (read EXIM and CCC)." He gave Iraq's debts as 40 billion dollars and remarked that nothing was left for Iraq to buy in the United States except wheat, "and no doubt that will soon be declared a dual-use item." Glaspie asked about the units of the Republican Guard sent to the border and what Iraq's intentions were. Saddam Hussein left the room to take a call from Mubarak and returned to say that the Kuwaiti crown prince would come to Baghdad on July 28, 29 or 30 and that "nothing will happen" until the meeting. The cable's note on the border question records Glaspie as saying that she had served in Kuwait twenty years earlier and that "then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs"; its summary states that the ambassador "made clear that we can never excuse settlement of disputes by other than peaceful means."[^16]

An Iraqi record of the meeting, translated from Arabic by ABC News and supplied to *[The New York Times](/organizations/new-york-times/)*, was published on September 23, 1990; the State Department declined to comment on its accuracy. It quotes Glaspie as saying: "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."[^17] Glaspie told the [Senate Foreign Relations Committee](/organizations/senate-foreign-relations-committee/) on March 20, 1991 that Saddam Hussein had lied to her, that the transcript had been selectively edited, and that "we did not realize he was stupid"; committee chairman [Claiborne Pell](/people/claiborne-pell/) said that by the time of the meeting Saddam Hussein "had clearly made up his mind to go into Kuwait."[^18]

Edward Gnehm, then the ambassador-designate to Kuwait, said in a 2014 oral history that his own confirmation hearing before the Senate subcommittee on the Middle East was held on the same afternoon, July 25, and that the chairman, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the only senator present, remarked that "We should just divide Kuwait, give half to the Iraqis and half to the Saudis."[^19]

### Authorization of Force

National Security Directive 54, dated January 15, 1991, cited H.J. Res. 77 as authority for military action against Iraq, listed among its aims to "destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities," directed that the United States discourage [Israel](/places/israel/) from taking part, recognized the territorial integrity of Iraq, and made it "an explicit objective" to replace the Iraqi leadership if Iraq used chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, supported terrorist acts, or destroyed Kuwait's oil fields.[^20] When the first Iraqi Scud missiles fell on Israeli cities after the war began, according to the Defense Department's report, the Israeli leadership decided not to take military action; the report also states that a Scud strike on a barracks in February inflicted more American casualties than any other single engagement.[^21] The House passed H.Con.Res. 41, condemning the Iraqi attack against Israel, on January 23, 1991 by 416 to 0.[^22]

On January 3, 1991 Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina told the Senate that "The Kuwaiti Government's idea of resistance is to hire a top-dollar public relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, to sell the American public on liberating Kuwait."[^23] On January 4 he said that "The Kuwaitis' PR crowd has been putting stories on the news about rape and about infants being yanked out of incubators by Iraqi soldiers; which I do not doubt is true."[^24] The Senate passed S.J.Res. 2 on January 12 by 52 to 47; Hollings voted no.[^25] The House passed H.J.Res. 77 the same day by 250 to 183, with Tom Lantos and John Edward Porter voting yes and Gonzalez voting no.[^26] H.J.Res. 77 became Public Law 102-1 on January 14, 1991.[^27]

### Citizens for a Free Kuwait and Hill and Knowlton

Middle East Watch reported in February 1992 that within weeks of the invasion Citizens for a Free Kuwait was established in [Washington](/places/washington-dc/), that it drew almost all of its funds from the Kuwaiti government, and that it hired Hill & Knowlton, which according to press reports was paid 5.6 million dollars between August and December 1990 and assigned 75 employees to the account. About 95 percent of the group's funds came from the Kuwaiti government, according to its disclosure documents filed with the [United States Department of Justice](/organizations/department-of-justice/). The firm's staff on the account included Craig Fuller, who had been chief of staff to George H.W. Bush when he was vice president, and Robert K. Gray, whose firm Gray & Company had merged with Hill & Knowlton in 1986.[^28]

On October 10, 1990 the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, chaired by Lantos and Porter, heard a fifteen-year-old witness identified only as Nayirah. She said: "While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers coming into the hospital with guns, and go into the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators and left the babies on the cold floor to die."[^29] On November 27 a witness presented to the Security Council as Dr. Issah Ibrahim, and identified by Middle East Watch as Dr. Ibrahim Bahbahani, said: "Under my supervision, 120 newborn babies were buried the second week of the invasion. I myself buried 40 newborn babies that had been taken from their incubators." Two days later the Council adopted Resolution 678. Middle East Watch reported that both appearances were organized on the Kuwaiti side by Hill & Knowlton and that Nayirah was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, Saud al-Nasser al-Sabah; Hill & Knowlton had said that she worked at the hospital under an assumed name. It reported that Bahbahani was an orthodontist who told it on November 30, 1990 that he had direct knowledge of forty babies, not 120, and who told ABC News on March 18, 1991: "I buried around thirty."[^29]

Amnesty International published a report on December 19, 1990 that quoted a Red Crescent doctor saying that 312 babies had died after being taken out of incubators.[^30] Several senators repeated the incubator account in the debate on the war resolution. On January 10 Senator Orrin Hatch said that "Even ailing infants have been left to die as their incubators were carted away by Saddam Hussein and his people."[^31] On January 11 Senator Christopher Bond said that Iraqi soldiers "have taken newborn infants and thrown them out of incubators"; Senator John McCain read the Amnesty passage including the figure of 312 and said "I wish that every American would take the opportunity of reading Amnesty International's report"; Senator John Breaux said that "In hospital maternity wards Kuwaiti infants were taken from their incubators and left to die. The incubators were sent back to Baghdad"; and Senator Frank Murkowski listed among the practices described by Amnesty "denying incubators to hundreds of premature babies."[^32] Bond, McCain, Breaux, Hatch and Murkowski voted for S.J.Res. 2.[^25]

Middle East Watch visited Kuwait from March 12 to 31, 1991, interviewed hospital staff, and examined hospital and cemetery records. It found that the al-Rigga cemetery recorded 30 infants buried on August 24, 1990, of whom 19 had died between June 27 and August 1, before the invasion; that the Maternity Hospital's incubators were all accounted for, close to eighty in its two main neonatal wards; and that the hospital director denied that babies had been thrown out of incubators. It concluded that it had "found no basis to the allegation that Iraqi troops took babies from incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals, causing them to die." Amnesty International had in April 1991 stated that it "found no reliable evidence" of the claim. Middle East Watch also found that a claim by Citizens for a Free Kuwait that a labor leader had died in detention after torture was false; he had died of cancer in hospital. As of February 1992 the Kuwaiti government and Hill & Knowlton maintained that the incidents occurred on a large scale; the Kuwaiti ambassador had said in a Canadian television interview that the incubators seen in hospitals after liberation were replacements shipped to Kuwait, and the American embassy in Kuwait had supported the account in a cable of February 4, 1992.[^33]

The Foreign Agents Registration Act registrant list shows Citizens for a Free Kuwait as registration number 4551, at 4301 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, registered on May 17, 1991, seventy-eight days after offensive operations ended, and terminated on March 19, 1992. The registrant list for Hill and Knowlton Strategies shows registration number 3301, dated November 10, 1981.[^34]

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation examined the episode on February 10, 1994 at the hearing on the nomination of Lauri Fitz-Pegado, who had worked in the Washington office of Hill & Knowlton, to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service. Fitz-Pegado testified that Hill & Knowlton represented Citizens for a Free Kuwait for five months before the war, that the witness did not give her last name because of fear of reprisals against her family, that her identity "was revealed to the committee," as she said Lantos, the co-chairman, had stated on the floor of the Congress, that she "had no reason whatsoever to question the veracity" of the testimony, and that she had met the doctor who testified at the [United Nations](/organizations/united-nations/) a few days beforehand and had relied on information the firm could not check in an occupied country. Senator Byron Dorgan stated that the Kroll Report, which he believed was paid for by the Kuwaiti government, found that the witness had been at the hospital for a brief visit but was not a volunteer and saw no dead babies removed; Fitz-Pegado answered that her understanding was that the report said the witness was in Kuwait, was a volunteer at the hospital, and witnessed the incident. Dorgan said he would have been skeptical had he known the witness was the ambassador's daughter.[^35]

The writer John R. MacArthur, author of *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, testified at the same hearing against the nomination. He stated that Citizens for a Free Kuwait filed no Foreign Agents Registration Act form "until well after the gulf war," that nearly 11 million dollars in fees paid to the firm came from the Kuwaiti government against about 17,000 dollars raised in the United States, that Hill & Knowlton's House lobbyist Gary Hymel and others including Fitz-Pegado arranged the caucus hearing, that Fitz-Pegado coached the witness, that Lantos's Congressional Human Rights Foundation occupied rent-free space in the firm's Washington headquarters, and that the firm's damage control after his January 6, 1992 article in *The New York Times* was managed by Frank Mankiewicz. He stated that six senators cited the incubator story in support of the war resolution.[^36] The Senate confirmed Fitz-Pegado on June 16, 1994 by 69 to 30; Dorgan and Lauch Faircloth voted no, McCain and Riegle yes.[^37]

### Costs and Foreign Contributions

Section 401 of Public Law 102-25 required reports on American costs and foreign contributions. In early September 1990 President Bush sent two missions abroad, one led by the Secretary of the Treasury (to the [United Kingdom](/places/united-kingdom/), [France](/places/france/), South Korea and [Japan](/places/japan/)) and one by the Secretary of State, James Baker (to [Saudi Arabia](/places/saudi-arabia/), the Kuwaiti government in exile, the United Arab Emirates, [Egypt](/places/egypt/), Brussels, [Italy](/places/italy/) and [Germany](/places/germany/)). In late September, in the fiscal 1991 continuing resolution, Congress expanded the Secretary of Defense's authority to accept contributions and established the Defense Cooperation Account to receive them.[^38] The Defense Department estimated American incremental costs at 61 billion dollars and reported that coalition countries had committed almost 54 billion dollars, about two-thirds from Gulf states and the rest largely from Japan and Germany, of which almost 53 billion dollars had arrived by March 11, 1992, more than 47 billion in cash.[^6]

The twentieth report, sent on October 15, 1992 by the Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman to Vice President Dan Quayle and Speaker Tom Foley, gave the final figures: 53,749 million dollars received (48,090 million in cash and 5,659 million in kind) against 53,951 million committed. By country, receipts were Saudi Arabia 16,854 million, Kuwait 16,059 million, the United Arab Emirates 3,870 million in cash and 218 million in kind, Japan 10,012 million, Germany 6,455 million and South Korea 251 million. The Defense Department's attached preliminary estimate put costs reported through August 31, 1992 at 56.8 billion dollars and, with potential additional exposure of 4.2 billion, at 61.1 billion. A footnote records that Germany made available more than 200 million dollars' worth of ammunition that the United States chose not to accept because the war had ended.[^39] In the Defense Department's April 1992 account, receipts as of March 11, 1992 were 16,003 million dollars from Saudi Arabia, 16,058 million from Kuwait and 52,893 million in all, and Japan provided almost 500 million dollars of in-kind equipment, of which more than 80 percent "were made in the United States or provided by US suppliers."[^40]

The General Accounting Office table of the Commodity Credit Corporation's contingent liability on Iraqi guarantees, dated November 1990, totals 2,008,599,986 dollars, scheduled by year from 154 million dollars in fiscal 1990 and 930 million in fiscal 1991 to 622 million in 1992 and 288 million in 1993.[^41]

### Chemical and Biological Exports and Veterans' Illnesses

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, chaired by Donald W. Riegle Jr., held a hearing on May 25, 1994 on dual-use exports to Iraq and their possible bearing on illnesses among American veterans. Riegle, who had voted against S.J.Res. 2 on January 12, 1991, stated that UNSCOM inspectors had found and destroyed 28 Scud warheads containing sarin, which a Defense Department official said had been obtained from the former [Soviet Union](/places/soviet-union/), and that a Defense Department medical official told his staff on September 7, 1993 that the question of chemical and biological exposure had not been explored because it was the position of "military intelligence" that such exposures never occurred, and that on November 10, 1993 the Pentagon acknowledged that Czech units had detected chemical agents in the theater but concluded that the detections were unrelated to veterans' health problems.[^42] Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch said on May 6, 1994, according to the committee report, that the United States had "no biological detection capability deployed with any forces, anywhere."[^43]

Committee staff compiled a list of biological materials shipped to Iraq from the American Type Culture Collection of Rockville, Maryland, under Commerce Department export licenses. They included 24 cultures, among them *Bacillus anthracis*, *Clostridium botulinum* types A and E, and *Francisella tularensis*, sent to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education on May 2, 1986; 11 cultures, including four *Bacillus anthracis* strains and *Clostridium botulinum* type A, sent to the Ministry of Trade on September 29, 1988; and *E. coli* and cloned human genetic material sent to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission in 1987, 1988 and 1989. A Centers for Disease Control listing for the period from October 1, 1984 added shipments including botulinum toxoid to an address in Baghdad in March and April 1986. Committee staff stated that records before 1985 were unavailable from the supplier and that the exported materials were not attenuated, and that inspections by UNSCOM found evidence of Iraqi research on pathogen enhancement involving anthrax, botulinum, *Clostridium perfringens*, brucella, tularemia and tetanus organisms.[^43] According to the committee's third staff report, dated October 7, 1994, a committee hearing on October 27, 1992 had revealed that the United States exported chemical, biological, nuclear and missile-system equipment to Iraq that was converted to military use.[^44]

The Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, created in May 1995, held 18 public meetings between August 1995 and November 1996. Its final report found that "current scientific evidence does not support a causal link" between veterans' symptoms and exposures to pesticides, chemical warfare agents, biological warfare agents, vaccines, pyridostigmine bromide, infectious diseases, depleted uranium, oil-well fires and smoke, or petroleum products, and described stress as "likely to be an important contributing factor." It also found that the Defense Department's investigations of possible chemical and biological exposures were "superficial." Since 1991 the department's public position had been that there was no use or presence of chemical weapons in the theater, and a Defense Science Board task force concluded in June 1994 that there was "no evidence" of exposures in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. On March 4, 1991 American personnel destroyed munitions containing 8.5 metric tons of sarin and cyclosarin in Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah and on March 10 destroyed rockets at a pit there. The committee concluded: "The evidence of CW agent release at Khamisiyah is overwhelming." The units within 25 kilometers included the 37th and 307th Engineer Battalions, the 60th and 146th Explosive Ordnance Detachments, the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion and components of the 82nd Airborne Division. The Central Intelligence Agency began its review of intelligence on chemical and biological agents in March 1995; the Defense Department's Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team conducted no interviews with possible eyewitnesses to Khamisiyah until June 1996, after UNSCOM confirmed in May 1996 its initial reports of chemical agents there.[^45]

The Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, chaired by James H. Binns, reported in November 2008 that Gulf War illness "affects at least one fourth of the 697,000 U.S. veterans who served" and that use of pyridostigmine bromide pills and pesticides during deployment were causally associated with it.[^46]

[^1]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, chapter I, "The Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 1-5. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^2]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Overview, pp. 23-24 (coalition forces; United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, August 2, 1990). https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^3]: Middle East Watch, "Kuwait's 'Stolen' Incubators: The Widespread Repercussions of a Murky Incident," vol. 4, no. 1, February 6, 1992, p. 5 and n. 14 (text of paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, November 29, 1990). https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kuwait/kuwait922.pdf
[^4]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, chapter VI, "The Air Campaign," and chapter VIII, "The Ground Campaign" (G-Day, February 24, 1991; offensive operations ended at 0800 on February 28). https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^5]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Appendix M, "Fire from Friendly Forces," introduction. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^6]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Appendix P, "Responsibility Sharing," pp. P-1 to P-3. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^7]: General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs*, GAO/NSIAD-91-76, November 14, 1990, appendix I, "Chronology of U.S.-Iraqi Agricultural Trade Relations and Foreign Policy, 1983-1990." http://web.archive.org/web/20260628093619/https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-76.pdf
[^8]: General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs*, GAO/NSIAD-91-76, November 14, 1990, pp. 1-3 (letter and results in brief). http://web.archive.org/web/20260628093619/https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-76.pdf
[^9]: General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs*, GAO/NSIAD-91-76, November 14, 1990, appendix II, "Evolution of Iraq's Participation in the GSM Program," table II.1. http://web.archive.org/web/20260628093619/https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-76.pdf
[^10]: George H.W. Bush, National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," October 2, 1989, pp. 1-3 (sections "Force Levels" and "Arms Sales"). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf (Wayback Machine capture of June 14, 2021: http://web.archive.org/web/20210614161833/https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf).
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Iraq-Italy: Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal," November 6, 1989, printed in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, 103d Cong., 1st sess., hearing of November 9, 1993, pp. 194-199. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^12]: Frederick B. Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," part I, printed in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, 103d Cong., 1st sess., hearing of November 9, 1993, pp. 359-360. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^13]: Frederick B. Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," part I, printed in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, 103d Cong., 1st sess., hearing of November 9, 1993, pp. 513-514 (sections on Kissinger Associates and on the recusal of Joseph D. Whitley). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^14]: Written answers of Christopher P. Drogoul, answers to questions 4 and 6, printed in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, 103d Cong., 1st sess., hearing of November 9, 1993, pp. 140-143. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Middle East Area Brief for 25 July 1990," combined message, secret, item 1, "Iraq-Kuwait: Is Baghdad Bluffing," CIA Reading Room document 0000200664 (partly redacted). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000200664
[^16]: American Embassy Baghdad (April Glaspie) to Secretary of State, "Saddam's Message of Friendship to President Bush," cable 90 Baghdad 04237, July 25, 1990, secret, paragraphs 3-5, 6, 23-24, 27-28 and 30. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/90BAGHDAD4237_a.html
[^17]: "Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy," *The New York Times*, September 23, 1990, p. 19 (text reproduced at https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/glaspie.html).
[^18]: "Saddam Lied, U.S. Envoy Testifies," *Roanoke Times* (Associated Press and *The Baltimore Sun*), March 21, 1991, p. A-1. https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/ROA-Times/issues/1991/rt9103/910321/03210377.htm
[^19]: Edward W. Gnehm, oral history interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, May 2014, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, excerpted in "A Day of Mixed Messages over Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait," adst.org, May 2017. https://adst.org/2017/05/day-mixed-messages-iraqs-invasion-kuwait/
[^20]: George H.W. Bush, National Security Directive 54, "Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf," January 15, 1991, top secret, paragraphs 2, 3(c), 7, 9 and 10. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd54.pdf (copy at https://web.archive.org/web/2id_/https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd54.pdf).
[^21]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Overview (Israeli response to the first Scud attacks), and chapter VI, "The Air Campaign," pp. 122-123. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^22]: U.S. House of Representatives, Roll Call 11, 102d Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 1991, H.Con.Res. 41, condemning the Iraqi attack against Israel, 416 to 0. https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/199111
[^23]: Remarks of Senator Ernest Hollings, January 3, 1991, pp. S11-S13, in *Congressional Record* (bound edition), vol. 137, Senate, January 1991, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1.pdf.
[^24]: Remarks of Senator Ernest Hollings, January 4, 1991, pp. S310-S313, in *Congressional Record* (bound edition), vol. 137, Senate, January 1991, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1.pdf.
[^25]: U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 2, 102d Cong., 1st sess., January 12, 1991, S.J.Res. 2 (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution), 52 to 47. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1021/vote_102_1_00002.htm
[^26]: U.S. House of Representatives, Roll Call 9, 102d Cong., 1st sess., January 12, 1991, H.J.Res. 77, 250 to 183. https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/19919
[^27]: Public Law 102-1, 105 Stat. 3, January 14, 1991. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg3.pdf
[^28]: Middle East Watch, "Kuwait's 'Stolen' Incubators: The Widespread Repercussions of a Murky Incident," vol. 4, no. 1, February 6, 1992, pp. 4-5 and nn. 9-10 (citing Gary Lee, "Kuwait's Campaign On the PR Front," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990, and "Kuwaitis Pay $5.6 Million to Publicity Firm," *The Washington Post*, December 19, 1990). https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kuwait/kuwait922.pdf
[^29]: Middle East Watch, "Kuwait's 'Stolen' Incubators: The Widespread Repercussions of a Murky Incident," vol. 4, no. 1, February 6, 1992, pp. 5-7 and nn. 12-13 (citing "Testimony by Nayirah," Congressional Human Rights Caucus, October 10, 1990, pp. 2-3, and United Nations Security Council, provisional verbatim record, S/PV.2959, November 27, 1990, p. 37). https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kuwait/kuwait922.pdf
[^30]: Middle East Watch, "Kuwait's 'Stolen' Incubators: The Widespread Repercussions of a Murky Incident," vol. 4, no. 1, February 6, 1992, pp. 3 and 6-7, nn. 8 and 15 (citing Amnesty International, *Iraq/Occupied Kuwait: Human Rights Violations Since August 2, 1990*, December 19, 1990, pp. 57-58). https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kuwait/kuwait922.pdf
[^31]: Remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch, January 10, 1991, p. S449, in *Congressional Record* (bound edition), vol. 137, Senate, January 1991, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1.pdf.
[^32]: Remarks of Senators Christopher Bond (p. S823), John McCain (p. S827), John Breaux (p. S830) and Frank Murkowski (p. S880), January 11, 1991, in *Congressional Record* (bound edition), vol. 137, Senate, January 1991, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1991-pt1.pdf.
[^33]: Middle East Watch, "Kuwait's 'Stolen' Incubators: The Widespread Repercussions of a Murky Incident," vol. 4, no. 1, February 6, 1992, pp. 3, 8-9, 14-15 and nn. 20, 34 (citing Amnesty International news release, April 19, 1991). https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kuwait/kuwait922.pdf
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act e-file system, registrants lists, Registration No. 4551, Citizens for a Free Kuwait (terminated registrants), and Registration No. 3301, Hill and Knowlton Strategies, LLC (active registrants), retrieved October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/Registrants/json/Terminated and https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/Registrants/json/Active
[^35]: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, *Nominations of Ginger Ehn Lew to be General Counsel ... Lauri Fitz-Pegado to be Assistant Secretary and Director-General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce*, S. Hrg. 103-966, 103d Cong., 2d sess., February 10, 1994, pp. 42-46 (testimony of Lauri Fitz-Pegado and questions of Senator Byron Dorgan). https://archive.org/details/nominationsofgin00unit
[^36]: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, *Nominations of Ginger Ehn Lew to be General Counsel ... Lauri Fitz-Pegado to be Assistant Secretary and Director-General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce*, S. Hrg. 103-966, 103d Cong., 2d sess., February 10, 1994, pp. 46-51 (testimony of John R. MacArthur). https://archive.org/details/nominationsofgin00unit
[^37]: U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 148, 103d Cong., 2d sess., June 16, 1994, confirmation of Lauri Fitz-Pegado (PN657), 69 to 30. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1032/vote_103_2_00148.htm
[^38]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Appendix P, "Responsibility Sharing," pp. P-3 to P-4. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^39]: Office of Management and Budget, Richard Darman, Director, letters of October 15, 1992 to Vice President J. Danforth Quayle and Speaker Thomas S. Foley transmitting the twentieth report, *United States Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs*, required by section 401 of Public Law 102-25, text, table 13 and attachment. https://archive.org/details/USCostsinthePersianGulfConflictandForeignContributionstooffsetsuchcostsasrequiredbySection401PL10225
[^40]: Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Appendix P, "Responsibility Sharing," figure P-1 and pp. P-7 to P-8. https://archive.org/details/ConductofthePersianGulfWarFinalReporttoCongress
[^41]: General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs*, GAO/NSIAD-91-76, November 14, 1990, appendix IV, table IV.2, "CCC's Contingent Liability Under the GSM-102/103 Programs for Iraq." http://web.archive.org/web/20260628093619/https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-76.pdf
[^42]: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, S. Hrg. 103-900, 103d Cong., 2d sess., May 25, 1994, pp. 1-6 (opening statement of Chairman Donald W. Riegle Jr.). https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesdual00unit
[^43]: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, S. Hrg. 103-900, 103d Cong., 2d sess., May 25, 1994, committee report of May 25, 1994, pp. 34-48 (printed at pp. 262-276 of the hearing print). https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesdual00unit
[^44]: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, S. Hrg. 103-900, 103d Cong., 2d sess., May 25, 1994, Committee Staff Report No. 3, "Chemical Warfare Agent Identification, Chemical Injuries, and Other Findings," October 7, 1994, pp. 435-437 of the hearing print. https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesdual00unit
[^45]: Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, *Final Report*, December 1996 (web edition, April 1997), Executive Summary and chapter 2 ("Chemical and Biological Weapons"). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA324720
[^46]: Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, *Gulf War Illness and the Health of Gulf War Veterans: Scientific Findings and Recommendations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2008, Findings in Brief, p. 1. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA490518