---
alias:
- Bingham Inquiry
- Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
category: BCCI Scandal
created: 2026-09-23
date: 1992-10-22
location: London, United Kingdom
relations:
- fn: 1
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Bank of England]]'
- fn: 1
  type: investigated
  with: '[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]'
- fn: 1
  reverse: true
  role: commissioned the inquiry with the Governor of the Bank of England
  type: participant_in
  with: '[[Norman Lamont]]'
summary: Lord Justice Bingham's 1992 inquiry into British supervision of BCCI, which
  cleared the Treasury, criticized the Bank of England as slow and overreliant on
  Luxembourg, and upheld its closure of the bank.
tags:
- Report
- BCCI
- BankOfEngland
- BankingSupervision
- 1990s
updated: 2026-09-23
---

The Bingham Report, formally the "Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International," was the report of Lord Justice Thomas Bingham into the regulation of the [Bank of Credit and Commerce International](/organizations/bank-of-credit-and-commerce-international/) (BCCI) by British authorities. It was commissioned after the bank's closure in July 1991 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, [Norman Lamont](/people/norman-lamont/), jointly with the Governor of the [Bank of England](/organizations/bank-of-england/), [Robin Leigh-Pemberton](/people/robin-leigh-pemberton/), and published on October 22, 1992, "unamended and in full but without the supporting appendices."[^1]

### Terms of Reference

Bingham's terms of reference were: "To enquire into the supervision of BCCI under the Banking Acts: to consider whether the action taken by all the [United Kingdom](/places/united-kingdom/) authorities was appropriate and timely; and to make recommendations." The report therefore did not attempt to describe the full history of BCCI, nor to judge how overseas authorities, the bank's directors or its auditors had carried out their duties; its bulk dealt with the Bank of England's supervision from 1972, when BCCI opened its first London branch, to its closure. Lamont told the House of Commons that Bingham "had access to all the material that he needed from the Government and the Bank. Nothing was withheld," and that the inquiry had been held in private "to avoid any prejudice to criminal proceedings and to encourage witnesses to give evidence."[^1]

### Findings

Bingham concluded that the conduct of Treasury ministers and officials was "not, in his view, open to criticism in any respect." He found that the Bank of England "was slow to impose on BCCI an appropriate supervisory regime" and "continued for too long to rely on the Luxembourg authorities to play the leading role"; that communication between supervisors, auditors and shareholders "was not as good as it should have been"; and that the Bank "should have been more alive to the significance of those messages it did receive and that it should have pursued more vigorously the leads it was given." The Bank did not grasp the scale of the fraud until it received the [Price Waterhouse](/organizations/price-waterhouse/) report of June 1991, the [Sandstorm Report](/events/sandstorm-report/); that report came as a surprise to the Bank, but Bingham argued that it should not have, concluding that "it would not have come as a surprise had Price Waterhouse more plainly and comprehensively brought the various elements of the fraud to the notice of the Bank as they emerged, or had the majority shareholders made a full and timely disclosure of all the facts known to them." He found the Bank's decision to close BCCI "an appropriate course of action," as was its decision "not to give effective advance notice to the majority shareholders" in [Abu Dhabi](/places/abu-dhabi/), since "all the options were unattractive." He also accepted that a bank established under the rules of 1992 "could scarcely hope to assume the form it did or last so long."[^1]

In debate, Gordon Brown quoted paragraph 2.513 of the report, rejecting the Treasury's position that it had no need to be informed: "I would find this view more persuasive if the Bank had chosen to tell the Treasury nothing about BCCI... But it was not the line which the Bank took," and noted Bingham's finding that "particularly after the Tampa arrest" BCCI had been "a fairly regular subject of report to the Treasury."[^1]

### Government Response

Lamont announced that the government accepted all of Bingham's recommendations, and that the Governor was setting up a special investigations unit and a legal unit within the Bank, strengthening its capacity for on-site examination, and making greater use of the Board of Banking Supervision. He said the report showed "no duplicity or bad faith" and that the Bank "was party to no conspiracy or cover-up"; the Labour member Bob Cryer called it "a whitewash and a cover-up." Asked whether the Governor should resign, Lamont said he had "every confidence in him." Of the American inquiry led by Senator [John Kerry](/people/john-kerry/), Lamont said: "I do not accept the findings of Senator Kerry's report. He did not have access to the documents to which Lord Justice Bingham had access and he did not take evidence from the Bank of England. I believe that some wild and incorrect allegations were made in that report."[^1] See [BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report](/events/bcci-kerry-brown-senate-report/).

[^1]: House of Commons, "BCCI (Bingham Report)," statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, and debate, *Hansard,* October 22, 1992. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/oct/22/bcci-bingham-report