---
alias:
- AIR evaluation
- An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications
category: Intelligence Scandal
created: 2026-09-21
end: 1995-11-28
location: Washington, D.C.
start: 1995-06-01
summary: The CIA-commissioned 1995 review of the DIA's Star Gate remote-viewing program,
  delivered September 29, 1995, which found a statistically significant laboratory
  anomaly and no intelligence value, and recommended against continuing operations.
tags:
- Event
- AIREvaluation
- StarGate
- RemoteViewing
- CIA
- DIA
- AmericanInstitutesForResearch
- JessicaUtts
- RayHyman
updated: 2026-09-21
---

In 1995, following a directive from Congress, the [CIA](/organizations/central-intelligence-agency/) took custody of the [DIA](/organizations/defense-intelligence-agency/)'s [Star Gate](/programs/stargate-project/) program, "which involved the use of paranormal phenomena, primarily 'remote viewing,' for intelligence collection," declassified its own parapsychology work of the 1970s "in order to facilitate a new, external review," and in June contracted the [American Institutes for Research](/organizations/american-institutes-for-research/) through its Office of Research and Development to evaluate it. The program had three parts: "'Operations,' using remote viewing to collect intelligence against foreign targets; 'Research and Development,' using laboratory studies to find new ways to improve remote viewing for use in the intelligence world; and 'Foreign Assessment,' the analysis of foreign activities to develop or exploit the paranormal." The foreign assessment part was excluded from the review. Operations "continued until the Spring of 1995, when the program was suspended."[^1]

### The Panel

The research review was given to two outside reviewers, [Jessica Utts](/people/jessica-utts/), professor of statistics at the University of California, Davis and statistical editor of the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, and [Ray Hyman](/people/ray-hyman/), professor of psychology at the University of Oregon, who had served on the National Research Council committee on human performance; Lincoln Moses of [Stanford University](/organizations/stanford-university/) advised on statistics and David Goslin, president of AIR, coordinated. The CIA transferred "all reports and documents relevant to the review," about 80 publications; one document "remained classified during the period of this review," and Michael Mumford of AIR read it and gave the panel an unclassified synopsis. The principal investigator of the research contract, [Edwin May](/people/edwin-may/), was asked to list the studies "which he believes provide the strongest evidence" and every unique study since the 1988 National Research Council report. Hyman wrote afterward: "May helped identify the ten best studies for Utts and me to evaluate." The operational review was done by AIR's own psychologists, who interviewed seven representatives of customer organizations, three remote viewers, and the program manager in July and August 1995.[^1][^2]

### The Research Reviews

Utts's report of September 1 opened: "Using the standards applied to any other area of science, it is concluded that psychic functioning has been well established. The statistical results of the studies examined are far beyond what is expected by chance. Arguments that these results could be due to methodological flaws in the experiments are soundly refuted." She put the effect "in the range between what social scientists call a small and medium effect," cited the 1988 analysis of all 154 experiments at [SRI](/organizations/stanford-research-institute/) from 1973, "over 26,000 individual trials" and 227 subjects, with a p-value "less than 10^-20," and tabulated May's ten [SAIC](/organizations/science-applications-international-corporation/) experiments: among them "Entropy II," 90 trials, effect size 0.550, p = 9.1 × 10^-8, and "AC with binary coding," 40 trials, effect size −0.067. Novices at SRI showed an effect size of 0.164 against 0.17 for novices in the ganzfeld experiments at the Psychophysical Research Laboratories; experienced viewers 0.385 against 0.35. She recommended that "future experiments focus on understanding how this phenomenon works," since "there is little benefit to continuing experiments designed to offer proof."[^3]

Hyman's report of September 11 confined itself to the ten SAIC experiments, "the only ones for which we have adequate documentation." He and Utts "both agree that the SAIC experiments were free of the methodological weaknesses that plagued the early SRI research" and "that the effect sizes reported in the SAIC experiments are too large and consistent to be dismissed as statistical flukes," and disagreed on whether the effects established anomalous cognition, whether flaws had been eliminated, and whether the results matched other laboratories; he answered no to all three, noting that "ten experiments, especially from one laboratory," were "far too few." On operations he recorded May's own estimate that "approximately 20 percent of the information supplied by a viewer is accurate," so that "80% of all the information supplied by this talented viewer will be erroneous," and warned that "subjective validation is well known to generate compelling, but false, convictions." Utts replied that the whole of parapsychology's funding since 1882 was "at best equivalent to the expenditures devoted to fewer than two months of research in conventional psychology," and that the Physicians Health Study of aspirin, with 22,000 men, "had it been conducted on only 2,200 men with the same reduction in heart attacks, would not have achieved statistical significance." AIR's synthesis found that "the two reviewers agreed far more than they disagreed" and that "most if not all significant findings have been obtained by using the same remote viewers, the same judge, the same target set, and the same scoring procedures," the judge being "apparently the Principal Investigator."[^1][^4]

### The Operational Review

The end users said the information was "stated in broad, vague terms," accurate "with regard to general stereotypical characteristics," inaccurate "with regard to concrete specifics," and inconsistent between viewers; "the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making decisions." The viewers told AIR "that their written reports were occasionally inconsistent with their viewings. They themselves considered it appropriate to make the written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target," and "that previous managers also changed viewers' reports." Customer evaluations had been collected since 1994 for forty viewings: on a six-point accuracy scale the mean was 3.0, on a five-point value scale 3.5, and all three viewers scored within a tenth of a standard deviation of each other. Two organizations, "one concerned with tracking people and one concerned with combat intelligence," reported better results, where "the viewers had substantial general background information concerning the targets." A separate government review of the same forty tasks, printed as an appendix, found that "normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation," that scores were higher where targets were specific, "e.g., the North Korean targets," and that "as an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion." Its own appendix is marked missing from the declassified copy.[^5]

### Conclusions

The report found "a statistically significant 'anomaly'" in the laboratory, no "convincing demonstration that a paranormal ability is involved," no identification of "the nature and source of the effect," and "no evidence that the phenomenon would prove useful in intelligence gathering." Its history of the program stated that "CIA's program began in 1972, but was discontinued in 1977," and that "DIA's direct involvement began about 1985." It observed of "some well-publicized cases of dramatic hits" that "there is reason to suspect that substantially more background information was available than one might at first assume." The last line of the body read: "Continued support for the operational component of the current program is not justified." Hyman wrote in 1996 that "because of some controversies within the program, a Senate committee decided to transfer the program from the DIA back to the CIA," that the operations program "involved six, and later three, psychics on the government payroll who were available to any government agency that wanted to use their services," and that the panel "all agreed that any scientifically meaningful evaluation of these operational psychic intelligence uses was impossible." [Hal Puthoff](/people/hal-puthoff/) quoted the report's count of "more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations" between 1986 and the first quarter of fiscal 1995, and cited a CIA public affairs statement on remote viewing of September 6, 1995. May's commentary of 1996 gave the report's public release as November 28, 1995.[^6]

### Release

The agency's public affairs office had said on September 6, 1995: "As mandated by Congress, CIA is reviewing available information and past research programs concerning parapsychological phenomena, mainly 'Remote Viewing' to determine whether they might have any utility for intelligence collection. CIA sponsored research on this subject in the 1970s. At that time, the program, always considered speculative and controversial, was determined to be unpromising." The report was released on November 28, 1995, the day ABC's *Nightline* broadcast "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?" [Ted Koppel](/people/ted-koppel/) opened: "For 20 years, U.S. intelligence agencies have been experimenting with ESP." ABC said it "has obtained a copy of that report which is critical of psychic spying," and that psychic spying "has been used in about 500 cases. Of those, fewer than a dozen were claimed to be right on target." May described the Semipalatinsk crane and "underground spheres"; [Joe McMoneagle](/people/joe-mcmoneagle/) said of the Iran hostages, "there were 2 or 3 others that were held away from the Embassy, and no one seemed to know exactly where that was. But we were instrumental in helping identify that location"; [Dale Graff](/people/dale-graff/) said of Dozier, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in"; the customs official William Green described the Jordan search, "next to an Indian gravesite," and Graff added, "we like to count it as a success." Hyman: "If someone pushed me hard right now, I'd have to say the odds are 99 to 1 that there's nothing to remote viewing." Utts: "There's some mystery out there that we need to solve." In the studio [Robert Gates](/people/robert-gates/) said that after the mid-1970s "CIA really during that period had a very limited role and essentially was just watching what was going on elsewhere," formalized by [John McMahon](/people/john-mcmahon/) in the mid-1980s; "I don't know of a single instance where it is documented that this kind of activity contributed in any significant way to a policy decision"; "we got into it, I think, mainly because we heard the Soviets were involved and also because the Congress, individual members of the Congress and some staff pushed us into it"; and "this is a tool best developed in the academic community or in the public arena, not by the intelligence community." A former CIA technical adviser identified only as "Norm," who had monitored the programs under McMahon until 1984, said "there's never been a case to my knowledge that produced any significant intelligence product," and explained the "8-martini" sessions: "The photograph you gave me, you developed that film in a house a mile down the road in the basement. That's grounds for an 8-martini evening, because the guy that took the picture had forgotten that fact. So, the knowledge was in the room, but not in any conscious way."[^7]

### May's Reply

May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun," that only one of seventeen members of the program's own oversight bodies was contacted, and that David Goslin of AIR had also administered the NRC's 1988 report; Utts wrote to him on December 19, 1995, that "I was explicitly asked by AIR staff NOT to mention the NRC report in my review!" and that "we were shown very little of the 'operational' remote-viewing work," and that after she asked to contact operational participants she "was contacted by the AIR staff and told that I was NOT to contact any of those individuals." May's conclusion: the evaluators "wanted to demonstrate that AC lacked usefulness for intelligence operations. They did so by construction rather than by careful analysis."[^8]

[^1]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. E-1 to E-5, 1-4 to 1-5, 2-1 to 2-8 and note 2, 3-80 to 3-84. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB438/docs/doc_57.pdf
[^2]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.
[^3]: Utts, Jessica. "An Assessment of the Evidence for Psychic Functioning," September 1, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-2 to 3-40, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-30. Pages 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-14 to 3-19 of the report.
[^4]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena," September 11, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-41 to 3-75, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 31-58. Pages 3-41 to 3-44, 3-67, 3-72 to 3-79 of the report, including Utts's "Response to Ray Hyman's Report of September 11, 1995."
[^5]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 4-7 to 4-15 and appendix D, pp. D-12 to D-16.
[^6]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 1-4, 3-84, 5-1 to 5-5; Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.; Puthoff, H. E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 63-76., note 10 and reference 1; May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-23, abstract only.
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Public Affairs, statement on remote viewing, September 6, 1995, as reproduced in Victorian, Armen, "Remote Viewing and the US Intelligence Community," *Lobster,* c. 1996; the original release was not seen. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
[^8]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. The letter of December 19, 1995, is printed at pp. 15-17 as Utts's reply to May's e-mail of December 17, checked against the page images.