The Suez Crisis, also known as the Second Arab–Israeli War or the Sinai War, was an invasion of [[Egypt]] in late 1956 by [[Israel]], followed by [[France]] and the [[United Kingdom]]. The invasion aimed to regain Western control of the [[Suez Canal]] and remove Egyptian President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] from power, who had nationalized the canal in July 1956.[^1] [[Israel]]'s immediate tactical goal in the war was to destroy the Egyptian Army and its ability to support and train the growing Palestinian fedayeen movement. The strategic goal was to destroy Nasser's ability to achieve Arab unity. The battle plan involved [[Israel]] initiating the attack, followed by demands from [[France]] and [[Britain]] for a halt to hostilities and withdrawal from the [[Suez Canal]], creating a buffer zone. When [[Egypt]] refused, [[France]] and [[England]] would launch assaults to occupy the canal.[^1] The battle plan went better than scheduled for [[Israel]], which stormed through the Egyptian Army and captured all of the [[Sinai]] by November 4. However, the intervention of the [[Soviet Union]], which issued a nuclear ultimatum to [[David Ben-Gurion]], [[Guy Mollet]], and [[Anthony Eden]], forced [[Britain]] and [[France]] to cease firing. [[Israel]], deserted by its two allies, was forced to agree to a cease-fire and the eventual deployment of a [[United Nations]] peacekeeping force in the [[Sinai]].[^1] The Israelis were disappointed by the French and enraged by [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]], who, they believed, had betrayed them. For [[David Ben-Gurion]], the lesson was clear: the Jewish community in [[America]] was unable to save [[Israel]]. This event solidified the conviction among some Israelis that they could not rely on external powers for their security, reinforcing the drive for an independent nuclear deterrent.[^1] ### Footnotes [^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3.