Arthur C. Lundahl was a key figure in U.S. aerial reconnaissance, directing the Photographic Intelligence Division of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. He had analyzed reconnaissance photos for the Navy during World War II and was tasked by President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to address the lack of aerial intelligence on the [[Soviet Union]].[^1] Lundahl played a crucial role in the [[U-2 Spy Plane]] program, becoming the American government's most listened-to briefing officer. He was responsible for presenting intelligence gathered from U-2 flights, including early signs of what would become the Israeli nuclear reactor at [[Dimona]].[^1] In late 1958 or early 1959, Lundahl rushed early raw photographs of the [[Dimona]] construction to the White House. Despite the clear evidence of a secret nuclear reactor, President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] showed no interest in further details or follow-up, a decision that puzzled Lundahl. He also relayed his findings on [[Dimona]] to [[Lewis L. Strauss]], chairman of the [[Atomic Energy Commission]], and a few AEC aides.[^1] By December 1960, the [[U-2 Spy Plane|U-2]] program was in disarray following the [[U-2 Incident]] where [[Gary Francis Powers]] was shot down. Lundahl recalled those months as being "full of finger-pointing and turbulence." By the mid-1960s, Lundahl and [[Dino A. Brugioni]] had moved on to new assignments in photo interpretation and were no longer directly involved in Israeli nuclear matters. Much of the primary analysis of nuclear intelligence shifted from the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] to the design and engineering laboratories for nuclear weapons at [[Los Alamos]] and [[Sandia]], and later [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]]. Any interesting intelligence on [[Israel]] was then routed through the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s Office of Science and Technology, headed by [[Carl E. Duckett]], to which Lundahl's [[National Photo Interpretation Center]] was reporting. Lundahl and Brugioni eventually realized that Duckett was no longer sharing all information about the Israeli bomb, marking the end of an era for their direct involvement.[^2] ### Footnotes [^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 4. [^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 5, 11.