David Ben-Gurion, often referred to as the "Old Man," was a central figure in the establishment of [[Israel]] and served as its first Prime Minister and Defense Minister from 1948 to 1963, with one brief interlude. He was a strong advocate for [[Israel]]'s self-defense and self-reliance, driven by a private nightmare of a second Holocaust at the hands of the Arabs. He believed that [[Israel]]'s security would come through its own capabilities, repeatedly linking the nation's security to its progress in science.[^1] Ben-Gurion was a key proponent of [[Israel]] developing its own atomic reactor, utilizing indigenous natural uranium and locally manufactured heavy water. He publicly stated that nuclear energy would soon produce electricity and desalinated water to make the [[Negev]] desert bloom. However, his primary goal was the development of a nuclear bomb, with the public statements serving as a cover. He oversaw this effort with the aid of his protégé, [[Shimon Peres]], and [[Ernst David Bergmann]], who headed the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission under the direct jurisdiction of the defense ministry.[^1] Ben-Gurion, Peres, and Bergmann sought international allies and private financing from wealthy American and European Jews to fund the secret nuclear program, believing any other approach would compromise its secrecy.[^1] Despite publicly supporting the American position in the [[Korean War]], Ben-Gurion's attempts to secure a regional security pact or inclusion under the American nuclear umbrella were unsuccessful. He even offered to send Israeli troops to fight alongside [[United Nations]] forces in South Korea, an offer declined by President [[Harry S. Truman]] due to fears of backing into a security arrangement with [[Israel]]. Throughout [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]]'s presidency, [[United States|America]] maintained an embargo on arms sales to [[Israel]], further solidifying Ben-Gurion's conviction that [[Israel]] needed an independent nuclear arsenal.[^1] Ben-Gurion's vision for [[Israel]]'s nuclear program was not without internal opposition. Many senior members of the ruling [[Mapai Party]] viewed an Israeli bomb as suicidal, too expensive, and too reminiscent of the horrors of the Holocaust. However, Ben-Gurion held firm, especially regarding the French-Israeli nuclear cooperation. He believed that [[Israel]]'s needs coincided perfectly with [[France]]'s, particularly in the early 1950s when both nations lacked the technical capacity to build a bomb independently.[^1] In late 1953, a disillusioned Ben-Gurion retired to his desert kibbutz at Sdeh Boker, near the future site of [[Dimona]]. He believed he could revive the pioneering spirit of Israeli society by resettling in the desert. His political control over the [[Mapai Party]] remained absolute, and he decreed that his jointly held positions of prime minister and defense minister be separated and filled by his chosen successors, [[Moshe Sharett]] as the new prime minister and [[Pinhas Lavon]] as defense minister. Ben-Gurion also arranged for [[Moshe Dayan]] to become the new army chief of staff, ensuring that Sharett's dovish policies would not go unchallenged.[^2] Ben-Gurion's immediate public mission after returning to office in 1955 was to restore the army's morale and public confidence. He was more convinced than ever that a policy of military reprisal was essential. Six days after taking office, on February 28, 1955, he authorized a large-scale retaliation against an Egyptian military camp at [[Gaza]], led by [[Ariel Sharon]], in response to a cross-border attack by Palestinian guerrillas. This raid escalated tensions and ended secret contacts between Sharett and [[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Nasser]].[^2] In late 1955, Ben-Gurion once again served as both defense minister and prime minister. With no international protest over the Canadian reactor sale, he decided in mid-September to formally seek French help for the Israeli bomb. He had already picked a location for the Israeli reactor in the basement of an old deserted winery at Rishon LeZion. He sent [[Shimon Peres]] with [[Ernst David Bergmann]] to [[Paris]] to negotiate for a reactor.[^2] Ben-Gurion was pleased with [[Charles de Gaulle]]'s promises of continued military aid, but he was not willing to trade an Israeli bomb for French warplanes. He did nothing to change the status quo at [[Dimona]] after his meeting with de Gaulle, and privately owned French construction firms continued their vigorous presence at [[Dimona]] until 1966.[^2] ### Footnotes [^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 2. [^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3.